

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Volume II, Issue 2

January 2008

A JOURNAL OF THE

TRI TERRORISM RESEARCH INITIATIVE

Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research

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13 Years since Tokyo: Re-Visiting the “Superterrorism” Debate

By Adam Dolnik

Introduction [1]

On 20 March 1995, members of the Aum Shirikyo cult used sharpened umbrella tips to pierce plastic bags filled with sarin nerve agent onboard five trains converging at Tokyo’s Kasumigaseki station. Twelve people died and 1,039 were injured in what remains the largest nonconventional terrorist attack in history. Then, only a month later, an explosives laden truck detonated in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring over 800 others in what at the time was the most lethal terrorist attack on United States soil. These two events, while unrelated, served as the catalyst for the overwhelming perception that it is no longer a question of “if” a mass casualty terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons will occur, but rather the question of “when” it will happen. In 2008, 13 years since these two tragic events, we are still waiting for these gory predictions of CBRN “superterrorism” to materialize. This article will revisit some of the core questions in the “superterrorism” debate, particularly in relation to recent trends, such as the apparent decentralization and de-territorialisation of the phenomenon.

The Debate

Even in 1995, the concerns about the threat of “superterrorism” were not new. As far back as 1975, Brian Michael Jenkins had already asked the most important questions.[2] Many other contributions into this largely theoretical debate followed, especially in light of the heightened sense of uncertainty and vulnerability to non-state actors as the end of the Cold War neared. Originally, the discussion concentrated primarily on capabilities, where the alleged ease of acquisition of CBRN materials following the breakup of the Soviet Union, as well as the arguably more widespread availability of expertise needed for the production and weaponization of such agents. Through the acknowledgment of technical hurdles associated with the successful delivery of CBRN agents, as well as the possible motivational constraints involved in the decision of terrorist groups to use such weapons; the debate became less theoretical. Another shift in the debate was represented by the claim that the rise of a phenomenon known as the “new terrorism” had eroded these constraints. In other words, the experts now believe the “new terrorists” – typically defined primarily by the religious nature of their ideology -- were not constrained by the political considerations that had traditionally led secular terrorist organizations to place limits on their violent activities. [3] The events of 1995 seemed to confirm this dire prediction. Even more importantly, 9-11 seemed to have once and for all resolved the perpetual question of whether terrorist groups would or would not be interested in causing mass casualties. Nevertheless, one question remains: why have we not witnessed another Tokyo?

Lessons From the Past and Their Implications for the Future

To answer the above question, it is useful to draw lessons from the history of CBRN terrorism. One of the first incidents of chemical terrorism in the post World War II environment was the 1946 poisoning of bread designated for a U.S. POW camp near Nuremburg by a group of Jewish terrorists known as Avenging Israel’s Blood (DIN). The attacks, in which arsenic mixed with glue was smeared onto the bottom of 2,500-3,000 loafs of bread, succeeded in hospitalizing 207 former SS officers, but failed to kill a single person. Another noteworthy attempt was the unsuccessful 1986 plot by the apocalyptic white Christian supremacist -Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSA)- to poison the water supply of several large U.S. cities using a mere 30 gallons of cyanide. In June 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became the first group to use chemical agents in a guerilla campaign, when they attacked a Sri Lankan Army encampment in eastern Kiran with canisters filled with chlorine. [4] Then on 27 June 1994, the first modern act of chemical terrorism took place in Japan, when six members of Aum Shinrikyo released sarin out of a van parked in a residential neighborhood of Matsumoto, killing seven people and seriously injuring 144 others. [5]

The first notable biological incident was an unsuccessful 1972 plot by a tiny environmentalist cult calling itself R.I.S.E.. This group attempted to culture large quantities of *salmonella typhi* and then contaminate the water supply of several large cities.[6] The first successful bioterrorist attack occurred in 1984 when the Rajneeshee

cult used a causative agent, salmonella, to contaminate salad bars in a small Oregon town in an effort to influence a local election. The cult, which chose an incapacitating rather than lethal agent, succeeded in making 751 people ill, but no one died. Then in 1994 and 1995, four Minnesota men, all members of an extremist antigovernment group called the Minnesota Patriots Council (MPC), became the first people ever convicted of possession of a biological agent for use as a weapon under the 1989 US Biological Weapons Antiterrorism Act. The men acquired the protein toxin ricin, which is derived from castor beans, possibly to use against local law enforcement and federal officials. Although the MPC's never carried out its plan, the group was heavily influenced by rightwing extremist Christian Identity ideology, similar to the ideology that motivated the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh. During the early 1990s, the Aum Shinrikyo carried out over a dozen large scale attacks with biological agents in Japan. Between 1990 and 1995 the group had spread botulinum toxin, the world's most toxic substance, and *bacillus anthracis*, the causative agent for anthrax, out of street cleaning trucks, automatic suitcases, and from the roof of its own compound near Mt. Fuji. However, the attacks went completely unnoticed, failing to produce a single casualty because the cult used a nonvirulent strain of botulinum toxin and only a harmless veterinary vaccine strain of *bacillus anthracis*. The 1990s also witnessed two cases of loners with ties to American militia and Christian identity movements. Larry Wayne Harris, who in 1995 ordered plague bacteria from a Maryland culture collection was arrested three years later in possession of bacillus anthracis, while Thomas Lewis Lavy was detained in December 1995 for possession of 130 grams of ricin. Finally, the 2001 attacks that utilized letters filled with *Bacillus anthracis* spores which resulted in 5 deaths were also probably carried out by an individual that fit a similar profile.

Nuclear and radiological terrorism have a less extensive record. We have yet to see a single incident of nuclear terrorism, and the only example of a radiological dispersal devices (RDD) has been the November 1995 discovery of a 32 kg parcel containing 10-50 mCi of cesium-137 at the Ismailovsky Park in Moscow. [7] An NTV television crew found the package after following instructions provided by Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev, who simultaneously threatened that many such containers were placed around Moscow and could be detonated at any time to cause several "mini-Chernobyls." The package did not actually contain an explosive device. [8]

All of these past plots carry several important lessons. First, it is interesting to note that historically chemical and biological terrorism cases have all been geographically confined to developed countries -- specifically the U.S. and Japan. This possibly suggests that the perpetrators' frequent exposure to modern technologies could be associated with a greater likelihood of their incorporation into terrorist operations. This, of course, has significant implications for the future given the increasing transnationalization of terrorist organizations and the rise of jihadi networks in Western countries. Due to their exposure to advanced technologies and the increasingly prevalent involvement of well-educated individuals, the home-grown cells may theoretically be in an increasingly suitable position to exploit CBRN for attack purposes. In addition, the rapid evolution of fields such as microbiology and their proliferation to developing countries may gradually spread this effect on a global scale.

The second lesson states that the vast majority of the historical incidents are crudely delivered, low-level attacks that have utilized primitive agents such as potassium cyanide, arsenic, salmonella, cesium 137, various pesticides, rat poisons and other dual use items. Such attacks have been comparatively ineffective in creating a large number of casualties, although they have succeeded in achieving a disproportional psychological impact. Nevertheless, more potent unconventional agents have been used by terrorists only scarcely, and only two groups -- Aum Shinrikyo and the unknown anthrax letter mailer(s) -- have ever killed anyone by using an actual warfare agent. Given the fact the perpetrators that in both of these instances had at their disposal a large and comparatively expensive weapons program --which in today's security environment would arguably be such chemical are much more difficult to access. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that future CBRN plots are likely to uphold the general trend of rudimentary delivery of low-end agents.

The third important lesson lies in the fact that despite our common tendency to use the term CBRN as synonymous with "weapons of mass destruction," in most cases it was *not* the desire to produce mass casualties that had led the respective perpetrators to adopting CBR agents as their weapon of choice. In most cases, the respective groups utilize unconventional agents because of their covert and difficult-to-detect nature (i.e. MPC, Rajneeshees), due to their capacity to trigger disproportionate fear (i.e. Chechens, anthrax letter mailer, Lavy) or simply as an inferior substitute for a temporarily degraded conventional capability (i.e. LTTE). [9] In some cases, of course, the perpetrators did seek to maximize their killing potential (i.e. Aum, RISE, CSA, DIN), but the lesson to emphasize here is that the commonly assumed link between CBRN and mass casualties remains an exception rather than a rule.

Finally, the historical record suggests that past perpetrators of CBRN terrorism seemed to share certain distinct characteristics that set them aside from other more “conventional” terrorist organizations. This suggests that while any discussion about the uncertainty of terrorist organizations’ interest (or lack thereof) in CBRN in the post 9-11 world is likely to be dismissed as obsolete, there is still some value in going through this exercise in order to narrow down the “profile” of most likely perpetrators for the future.

Beyond “motivation”

Many of today’s threat assessments of CBRN terrorism tend to focus simply on the general nature of the respective group’s ideology (specifically along the “religious” vs. “secular” divide), in combination with specific statements of interest in mass-casualties or “weapons of mass destruction.” For instance, most analyses of al-Qaeda’s potential to use CBRN quickly establish intent by simply citing the following statements made by important al-Qaeda figures:

“Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons [of mass destruction], then I thank God for enabling me to do so.”

Usama bin Laden interviewed in Time Magazine
(December 1998)

“We have the right to kill 4 million Americans, two million of them children.”

-Abu Ghaith

in “Why We Fight America”

(June 2002)

“If a bomb was dropped on them that would annihilate 10 million and burn their lands...this is permissible.”

-Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd in “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels”
(May 2003)

While these statements are a serious cause for concern and should certainly not be taken lightly, it is important to emphasize that a comprehensive threat assessment of “intent” in the CBRN terrorism context needs to go further than the common focus on a group’s declaration of “interest.” A meaningful analysis needs to focus on the question of *how far is the given group willing to go in order to actually achieve a significant capability?* While it may be reasonable to assume that groups like al Qaida would use a chemical weapon if they stumbled across one, the question we must ask is: “how far is the respective group really willing to go to obtain it?” What level of material and human resources is the leadership willing to sacrifice, and how much is it willing to risk in terms of operational security in order to achieve a CBRN capability? If the organization is attracted to this option simply because of its desire to kill as many people as possible, why not just attack more often, at more locations, and on a greater scale with weapons that are already available and have already proven to be effective? Why invest a massive amount of precious resources into a new technology that only few if any know how to use and that could potentially end up killing the perpetrators themselves—all without any guarantee of success? Why risk a negative public reaction and a possibly devastating retaliation likely to be associated with the use of CBRN weapons?

As we can see from the complexity of these questions, there is clearly an additional element besides the desire to kill on a large scale that plays a decisive role in a terrorist group’s decision to launch a biological or nuclear weapons program, one so strong that it is able to offset the currently unfavorable cost-benefit calculation [10] in favor of chemical or biological weapons over other conventional options. Empirically speaking, organizations that have in the past gone beyond merely expressing interest in chemical and biological agents have been groups for whom these weapons have had a strong expressive or emotional value, such as the desire to kill without shedding blood or the interpretation of poisons and plagues as God’s tools. An example of this is the frequent reference to biblical plagues commonly used by various radical Christian groups, or the strange fascination of Aum Shinrikyo’s leader Shoko Asahara who wrote poems about sarin. Alternatively, environmentalist cults have interpreted diseases as “natural” tools used by Mother Nature to eliminate the human race that has through technological advances and an inconsiderate use of natural resources caused a natural imbalance, which according to the group could only be restored by an elimination of the world’s most destructive species. [11] Alternatively, more ideologically “conventional” groups that place great emphasis on the principle of unconditional reciprocity may under some conditions resort to CBRN violence, especially in the case of repeated

claims of having been subjected to the same treatment by the enemy - in this case the use of poisons against the population the group claims to represent. An example of this is the attraction to poisons by the aforementioned Avengers (DIN), who argued that because six million Jews were poisoned in concentration camps, six million German civilians also had to be killed in the same manner for justice to be served. [12] On a similar note, an attraction to chemical weapons can be expected from Chechen and Kurdish groups based on their claims that their constituencies have also been targeted with such weapons. We can also expect an attraction to radiological terrorism on behalf of groups in countries such as Iraq, Bosnia or Kosovo, where much resentment has been raised by the American use of depleted uranium (DU) munitions.

It is this specific expressive component that will play a key role in the matrix of useful intelligence indicators that can be used to identify potential perpetrators beforehand. Other such indicators include high level of paranoia, an apocalyptic vision, presence of an undisputed charismatic leader displaying signs of psychological idiosyncrasies and an attraction to truly extreme violence, high level of operational and physical risk taking, membership base including members with scientific backgrounds, the group's expressive emphasis to innovation and extremely high ambitions in the operational realm. [13] At the same time, while these predictive indicators can provide us with a useful tool, we must be aware of the fact that the vast majority of previous CBW plots have not involved prominent terrorist organizations, but rather previously *unknown* individuals and groups that emerged seemingly out of nowhere. This means that a meaningful threat assessment needs to expand past existing terrorist organizations to include unknown actors, and that new assessment tools need to be designed to provide timely and accurate intelligence on the activities of such actors.

This is especially the case given the increasing transformation of terrorist organizational structures from the hierarchical, political party-like formations into more loosely knit networks of cells operating without any real central command. [14] The characteristics of the worldwide network we know as al Qaida, or the concept of "leaderless resistance" embraced by the North American Christian Identity and animal rights movements, provide good examples of this phenomenon, which in many ways represents one of the downsides of globalization. Today's terrorists can easily communicate via e-mail, using commercial encryption programs and coded messages posted on various Web sites and chat rooms, a fact that has resulted in an unprecedented international reach of terrorist networks and the proliferation of operational know-how among groups through knowledge sharing. More importantly, the proliferation of the Internet has also contributed to the rise of the so-called "home-grown terrorism", or the emergence of active *jihadi* terrorist networks in the West. Members of these small networks identify themselves with al Qaida's global ideology, but essentially operate autonomously and frequently without any direct link to the central command. This dynamic significantly influences our capability to accurately assess the threat, given the fact that the potential intent of these homegrown-cells to acquire and use CBRN will rarely be identifiable beforehand. Today, one can theoretically become a "member" of a terrorist group simply by embracing its ideology, gaining operational knowledge through manuals accessed from the Internet, and carrying out attacks in the group's name via its signature *modus operandi* and general targeting guidelines.

The unpredictability of such independent actors is especially worrying because terrorist organizations may recruit volunteers that have never gone through structured training or formal organizational acceptance, has contributed to the erosion of motivational constraints to engage in acts of catastrophic terrorism. Because members of such ad hoc groups operate without any moderating influences from the more politically and strategically conscious central leadership, this decentralization of decision making has also contributed to the deterioration of restraint that traditionally played a role in the initiation and planning of spectacular attacks.

This might especially be the case with respect to CBRN. For instance, al Qaida's pre 9-11 doctrine called for the acquisition of CBRN mainly as a deterrent and counterbalance against Israeli and American non-conventional arsenals (as opposed to a first strike option) creating a setting in which any use of such technology would be carefully weighted by the leadership. [15] In this light, the continuing fragmentation of the group and the emergence of a global movement of independent and self-radicalized cells subscribing to al Qaida's global ideology has arguably created a situation, in which the decision to use CBRN would theoretically be in the hands of only several individuals acting in a one-time capacity with no real concern for the consequences. In such a setting, the motivational, strategic, and political obstacles to using CBRN have become even less relevant today. This is especially true given the increased aggressiveness of the new "al Qaida" doctrine with regards to CBRN, which now incorporates not only religious sanction, but even strategic preference for using such means. [16] For an independent cell seeking guidance on *jihadi* websites and forums about the permissibility of employing CBRN technology to attack the enemy, the answer would be an overwhelming "yes". That being said, in order for a CBRN attack to actually take place, this intent would also need to be matched by the

capability to acquire and effectively weaponization of a CBRN agent.

Acquisition and Weaponization of CBRN Agents

Admittedly, any analysis that seeks to address the threat of “CBRN terrorism” collectively as a monolithic phenomenon is inevitably too vague to be useful, given the fact that C vs. B vs. R vs. N are very disparate threats with regards to issues such as difficulty of acquisition, potential to cause significant damage, technological hurdles involved in mass production and weaponization, and challenges posed for states on the side of detection, prevention, and response. [17] In light of this limitation, it is not the ambition here to provide an exhaustive analysis, but only a general coverage of the core issues.

For most CBR (but not N) agents the acquisition step is not difficult because many weapons-usable substances have legitimate uses and are therefore relatively widely available. Further, the boom of information technologies and the Internet makes the necessary know-how for successful procurement of cultures more widely available than ever before. On the other hand, the production of large quantities of a biological agent, as well as its successful weaponization (the process of producing a mass casualty capable delivery system for the acquired agent), is a much more complex and difficult endeavor than generally believed. [18] The difficulty of weaponizing chemical and biological substances varies greatly based on the agent of choice. Inflicting mass casualties with chemical and non-contagious biological agents such as anthrax or tularemia requires a high-tech delivery because every victim has to come into direct contact with the agent in order to be affected.

One popular scenario for a bioterrorist attack has been the mass contamination of a city’s water supply. A major difficulty of successfully perpetrating such an attack is represented by the fact that most water-borne organisms die in the presence of sunlight, ozone, or chlorine. One possibility solution would be the contamination of water post-treatment/ Such an operation would involve pumping enormous quantities of agent into the water distribution system while avoiding detection – not an easy feat considering the huge quantities of agent needed and the fact that the water in the pipelines is under pressure. Assuming terrorists overcame all of the hurdles associated with contamination of a city’s water supply, the chances of inflicting mass casualties are minimal, unless the agent used is colorless, tasteless, and odorless, in order to facilitate mass consumption. Despite the fact that this seems common sense, past plots and a review of dozens of terrorist chemical and biological weapons manuals demonstrate the lack of realization of this simple fact on behalf of most terrorist groups. Consider, for instance, the February 2002 plot to poison the water supply of the U.S. Embassy in Rome, which has been widely cited as evidence of al Qaida’s “chemical weapons” capability. [19] In this case, the four Moroccan perpetrators arrested in Italy possessed 8.8 pounds of potassium ferrocyanide - enough to theoretically kill several individuals, but certainly not suitable for a water borne attack – but were unsuccessful because the agent changes color significantly when mixed with water. Thus, providing ample warning to the possible target. [20]

The next commonly discussed scenario is the open-air dissemination of a non- contagious agent such as *bacillus anthracis* (a.k.a. anthrax). Anthrax is the prototypical biological weapons agent - it is relatively easy to produce, it is extremely virulent, and the infection is not contagious, so the outbreak will not spread beyond those affected directly. Most importantly, anthrax forms rugged spores when exposed to environmental stresses, and these spores facilitate processing and weaponization. However, significant hurdles to effective open-air dissemination of anthrax exist as well. While the liquid form is relatively easy to produce, it is much more difficult to deliver effectively because it is susceptible to clumping into heavy droplets that fall to the ground instantly, providing insufficient time for the victims to inhale the agent. Conversely, the powder form is significantly less challenging to disseminate, but is much more difficult to produce; its effective dissemination requires an aerosol composed of particles between one and five microns in diameter. Production of such fine aerosol requires a sprayer system that is equipped with specialized nozzles that are not widely available. Finally, an open-air dissemination of aerosol is also highly susceptible to meteorological conditions that make targeting much less controllable.

Contagious agents on the other hand, allow for a much less efficient delivery, as it is only necessary to infect a small group of people, who can then spread the disease by secondary transmission. In this regard, the popular scenario of a suicide “bomber” infected with smallpox and cruising along crowded city areas comes to mind. This scenario is, of course, not nearly as technologically sophisticated as the scenarios mentioned above. However, obtaining the virus today is almost impossible, and even then there are very few organizations in the world that would be inclined to use such an unpredictable method; contrary to a classical suicide bombing one of the key advantages of which is a high level of control of the circumstances under which the detonation oc-

curs, in the “biosuicide” attack the organizers lose any control whatsoever following the first secondary transmission of the disease. Few of today’s known groups seem willing to launch a terror campaign that would have the capacity to indiscriminately eliminate not only the intended victims, but also the group’s constituencies, membership and leadership, as well as their friends and families. [21] It is thus not surprising that none of the many existing biological weapons manuals inspected by the author has ever covered the category of contagious agents.

While the technological difficulty of obtaining a mass casualty capable chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon is clearly the dominant reason for why the use of such weapons by terrorist organizations has been extremely rare, the comparative ease with which a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could be assembled raises the question of why there has not yet been a single incident involving the “dirty bomb” scenario. RDDs can be very crude and can take the form of simple placement of radioactive material in a location with the intent of causing damage, destruction, or injury by the means of radiation produced by the decay of the material used, or by the dispersal of radioactive material over a larger area by the means of attaching it to a conventional explosive. [22] The damage and injury inflicted by such a device would depend greatly on the amount and type of the radioactive material used. The effects of a “dirty bomb” would be threefold: the blast and fragmentation effects of the explosive device, radiation effects, and psychological effects. [23] Of these, the psychological implications would be the most devastating, mainly because of the automatic association of the word “radioactive” with “nuclear” in the minds of the majority of world population. In reality, however, more people would probably die in stampedes and car accidents resulting from the panicking population’s desire to leave the affected area immediately, than from direct effects of radiation. Second, in the hierarchy of destructive impact would be the damage inflicted by the blast and the fragmentation effects of the explosive device to which the radioactive material was attached. The physical damage caused by the actual radiation effects would in most instances be minimal, comprising mainly of area denial rather than mass casualties resulting from radiation poisoning. And while the possibility of a significantly lethal RDD design cannot be ruled out completely, even states with access to virtually unlimited amounts of highly radioactive materials have found this difficult. The main obstacle in this case was the handling of gamma-emitting radioactive substances, which requires the use of extremely heavy and bulky protective lead shielding. [24] Other obstacles included the problems associated with grinding the material into the five-micron size and mixing it with an inactive solid substance to enhance dispersion and increase inhalation hazard, the variability of whether conditions, and the ability of buildings to absorb large amounts of radiation. [25] Nevertheless, the relative ease with which an RDD can be assembled combined with the immense psychological effects such a weapon has to offer, make the “dirty bomb” scenario a threat that is very real.

Assessment of Contemporary Terrorist Capabilities

Due to significant obstacles faced by terrorist organizations in the process of weaponizing chemical, biological, and nuclear agents; most of the doomsday scenarios often cited by security agencies and sensationalist media accounts are unlikely to be fulfilled any time soon. In fact, judging by past incidents and dozens of CBRN terrorism manuals, contemporary terrorist organizations still demonstrate a relatively naïve approach to this issue. Even al Qaida and its associate groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI) have demonstrated a very limited ability to acquire a significant chemical or biological capability. [26]

For instance, al-Qaida had initiated its plan to develop chemical and biological weapons -- the so-called “Project Yogurt” -- as far back as 1999. [27] In the initial stages, the alleged plan was to conduct a survey of literature while the organization looked to recruit a scientist to run the program. In 2001, al-Qaida’s third in command, Mohammed Atef, approached JI’s top operational leader of Hambali with a request to find a scientist that would take over the program. Hambali introduced Yazid Sufaat, a U.S. trained bio-chemist and former Malaysia military officer, who subsequently spent several months attempting to cultivate anthrax in a laboratory near the Kandahar airport. [28] Plans were also established to set up another laboratory in Malaysia and a third lab in Bandung, Indonesia, through Sufaat’s company called Green Laboratories Medicine. [29] But while this intent may sound scary on paper, it is interesting to compare the logistics and expertise of al-Qaida’s biological weapons program with that of the Aum Shinrikyo, the undisputed leader in this field. Prior to deciding on the production of chemical agents, Aum Shinrikyo had conducted no less than 10 attacks with biological agents (particularly *bacillus anthracis* and botulinum toxin), under the direction of Dr. Seichi Endo, a molecular biologist who had obtained graduate degrees in genetic engineering, genetics, and medicine from the prestigious Kyoto University. [30] Even though the group had at its disposal an unrivaled amount of resources equaling nearly \$1 billion, a team of no less than 20 graduate level scientists, and state of the art laboratories

and equipment, it failed to kill a *single* person with a *biological* weapon. Compare that with al-Qa'ida's "Project Yogurt," which had the startup budget of only \$2-\$4,000, was based on an initial survey of literature from the 1920s to 1960s, [31] and its chief "scientist" only had a bachelors degree in biological sciences and a minor in chemistry from Cal State University in Sacramento. In this perspective, al-Qa'ida's ability to kill thousands of people with biological agents seems rather questionable.

Could this reality suddenly change? The rapid scientific advances in the fields microbiology and genetic engineering seem to suggest so, but in order to get the full picture we must also consider the issue of willingness and ability of terrorist organizations to adopt new technologies. History tells us that terrorist organizations rarely alter their established *modus operandi*, and when they do, these changes are driven by very specific reasons. [32]

The first such reason comes in the event of an introduction of government countermeasures, such as target hardening efforts that serve as a direct obstruction to the tactics used by terrorists in the past. While most groups can be expected to respond by selecting substitute targets, an innovative organization will refuse to go down this path of least resistance in order to increase its probability of success. Instead, such a group will work to overcome these countermeasures by means that have not been accounted for by the enemy, often placing an emphasis on projecting an image of invincibility as well as mocking the state for failing to stop the attack despite all of its resources. In this light certain chemical and biological agents pose a direct threat for the future, as they could be used to overcome security measures already in place at key targets such as airports. And while CBW employment in this scenario is unlikely to involve a mass casualty capable delivery system, even crudely delivered agents deployed onboard a commercial airliner in midcourse flight could result in very significant damage and casualties.

Another scenario in which a group can be expected to alter its operational methods in a novel direction comes in the presence of an inherent ideological pre-determination toward using certain technologies or the need to innovate in order to obtain the capability to match the level of violence associated with the respective ideological and strategic preferences. [33] An example of this in the CBRN realm is the incorporation of certain chemical or radiological agents into explosive devices, along the lines of the HAMAS inclusion of pesticides in suicide belts for anticoagulant effect, [34] or the detonation of chlorine canisters recently introduced by the insurgents in Iraq. What is important to emphasize here, is that mass casualties remain an unlikely outcome even in this scenario, as most of the added agent tends to be consumed by the initial explosion. Nevertheless, the psychological effect of such operations cannot be underestimated.

The third relevant scenario of a trigger to terrorist adoption of new operational methods is an incidental or unintended acquisition of a particular human or material resource. In the CBR context this is a real threat, especially in light of the growing decentralization of the global *jihadi* movement and the associated phenomenon of "self-starter groups" emerging in Western countries. If, for instance, a highly skilled microbiologist decided to launch an attack in the name of "al Qaida," it is likely that such a person would use the skills and technologies that he or she is most familiar with, as opposed to resorting to traditional terrorist weaponry. Given the growing prevalence of highly educated individuals actively participating in terrorist violence, the scenario of a "homegrown" terrorist cell attacking with a CBR capability in a western city is becoming increasingly more imaginable. That being said, even in this scenario, there would be significant technological obstacles standing in the way of producing mass casualties.

Conclusion

Today's terrorist organizations demonstrate only a limited potential to use CBRN agents for the purposes of launching an attack capable of causing mass casualties or significant physical damage. Nevertheless, the threat of small scale operations involving certain chemical, biological and radiological agents is certainly real, and is most likely on the rise. Of great concern in this light is the gradually growing understanding of the difficulty of causing mass destruction with CBRN among the terrorists themselves. Whereas a decade ago the known terrorist plots and CBRN manuals demonstrated a very high level of technological naivety and ridiculous ambitions, today's organizations seem to have a greater appreciation of the technological hurdles they are facing – and seem to be reflecting on this reality by shelving unrealistic projects in favor of focusing their energy on the more feasible scenarios. Even more importantly, today's terrorists seem to have a much greater appreciation of the psychological impact that even small-scale CBRN operations will have on us, [35] leading to an increasing likelihood of the occurrence of such attacks in the future. Given the importance of the primarily psychological

dimension of this threat, it will be even more vital for us in the future to take these plots for what they are, and to avoid misleading interpretations of such events as “weapons of mass destruction terrorism.”

With a longer-term outlook, the issue of specific concern is the continual process of transnationalization of terrorism and the associated rise of global decentralized networks of small cells operating independently of any central command. Given their lack of a longer term strategic outlook and the overwhelmingly supportive views of the online jihadi community on the issue of using CBRN, these cells are arguably going to be even less constrained in their motivation to deploy such technologies for attack purposes. While this increasing motivation in combination with our limited ability to accurately assess it beforehand is certainly a cause of concern, it must be emphasized that this growing intent is by no means matched by capability - in fact, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the two. Small groups of individuals operating in a hostile environment under pressure of the security services are likely to be in very difficult position to breach the technological hurdles associated with a mass-casualty CBRN weapons program. Actually, the homegrown cells typically experience very limited success in launching even small to medium-scale conventional attacks without obviation and disruption, which has led some members of the online jihadi community to call for *less sophisticated* and operationally *less challenging* attacks and plots, as a substitute to the current preference for synchronized suicide bombings. The further arrests of cells in Germany, U.S., Norway, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, U.K., Australia, and the Netherlands, as well as the failure of even rudimentary attacks launched in June 2007 by a comparatively well-educated group of jihadis in London and the Glasgow airport, seem to confirm that the upcoming trend of terrorist operations will be one of *decreasing*, rather than increasing, technological sophistication. And while the continuing process of “democratization of destructive power” will arguably make it easier for even small groups of individuals to wreak havoc and destruction, the prospects for significant acts of “superterrorism” appear bleaker than 13 years ago.

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NOTES:

[] An extended version of this article will appear in Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova (Eds.) *Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation* forthcoming

[2] Brian Michael Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” RAND Paper P-5541 (1975) p. 4

[3] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Orion Publishing Co. 1998) p. 201

[4] “Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers Use Poison Gas Against Government Troops, Says Senior Officer,” *The Xinhua General Overseas News Service* (06/18/90)

[5] David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Jonathan Tucker ed. *Toxic Terror* (London: MIT Press, 2000) p. 207

[6] This incident is sometimes incorrectly attributed to a neo Nazi group “Order of the Rising Sun.”

[7] W. Lee Rensselaer III, *Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) p. 135-6

[8] The container, which weighed approximately 15 kilograms and measured 400 by 300 by 250 centimeters, was wrapped in yellow paper and plastic, and contained an ordinary piece of equipment found in the oil industry.

[9] is LTTE's employment of chlorine gas during the siege of a Sri Lankan Army camp in Kiran in 1990, which also came as a direct result of the group's decreasing access to ammunition following the seizure of several of the group's arms shipments. (Hoffman, Bruce, “The Debate Over Future Terrorist Use of Chemical Biological, Nuclear and Radiological Weapons” (RAND 2000) p.13

[10] Consider the experience of Aum Shinrikyo, who after investing \$30 million into sarin alone, succeeded in killing only 12 people in its most lethal attack - a number that pails in comparison to the 192 persons who died in the 2003 suicide attempt on the Seoul subway, which was executed by a mentally disturbed individual who used technology requiring only about a \$3 investment: a paper milk container filled with gasoline and a cigarette lighter. The lesson is that even for a group that tries to maximize casualties, the cost benefit analysis is not necessarily in favor of “weapons of mass destruction.”

[1] Adam Dolnik, *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends* (Routledge, 2007) p. 178

[12] Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal: *Avenging Israel's Blood*. In Tucker, Jonathan B., *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000) p. 26

[13] Adam Dolnik, *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends* (Routledge, 2007) p. 177

[14] Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, *The New Terrorism* (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002) p. 7

[15] Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, “Does Intent Equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (November 2005), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/123/123salama.pdf>

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] For instance, only N and B but not R and C have the capacity to achieve “mass destruction”.

[18] The term “weaponization” refers to the process of producing an effective delivery system for the acquired agent. Generally, two basic scenarios for a chemical or biological terrorist attack exist. One is a relatively crude, small-scale delivery along the lines of the 2001 anthrax letters, which can succeed in causing massive panic and disruption, but lacks the potential of inflicting significant damage in terms of loss of human life. The other scenario is a mass-casualty attack, which is much less likely, but which could potentially be catastrophic. It is the latter type of attack that is the primary focus in this study.

[19] Melinda Henneberger, “4 Arrested in Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Rome,” *New York Times*, February 21, 2002, p. A15.

[20] For an excellent analysis of this incident see: Croddy, Eric, Osborne, Matthew, and McCloud, Kimberly, “Chemical Terrorist Plot in

- Rome?" Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Available at: <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020311.htm> (accessed on 6/15/07)
- [21] It is interesting to note that in the jihadi manuals surveyed by the author, the category of contagious agents tends to be avoided completely. The AQ manual "Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants" when discussing assassination with biological agents even specifically limits the discussion "only to poisons that the mujahed can prepare without endangering his health"
- [22] James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat" Internet. Available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum136.html> (accessed on 1/23/02)
- [23] Ibid.
- [24] James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat" Internet. Available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum136.html> (accessed on 1/23/02)
- [25] Ibid.
- [26] For excellent analyses of al Qaeda's potential to acquire and use CBRN see Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does Intent Equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (November 2005), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/123/123salama.pdf>. and René Pita, "Assessing al-Qaeda's Chemical Threat," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, Volume 20, Issue 3 (September 2007), pp. 480 – 511. For an analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah see Dolnik, Adam and Gunaratna Rohan: "Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism." in Howard, Russell D. and Forest, James J.F. (eds.) *Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (McGraw-Hill, 2007)
- [27] Cullison, Alan, *Inside al Qaeda's Hard Drive*. Atlantic Monthly. September 2004
- [28] 9-11 Commission Report, p. 151
- [29] Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Al Qaeda analyst on cricket terrorist plot claims. (10/10/2006) Full transcript of the interview with Zachary Abuza is available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1759229.htm> (accessed on 12/10/06)
- [30] Miller, Judith, *Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War*, (New York: Touchstone, 2002) p. 160
- [31] Cullison, Alan, *Inside al Qaeda's Hard Drive*. Atlantic Monthly. September 2004
- [32] Dolnik, Adam, *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends* (London: Routledge, 2007) p. 173
- [33] Ibid.
- [34] Weizman, Steve, "HAMAS Pleased with Addition of Poison to Bombs," Associated Press (December 12, 2001)
- [35] For the more details about this argument demonstrated on the Kemal Bourgass, (January 2003) and Dhiren Barot, (November 2006) plots, see: Hoffman, Bruce, "CBRN Terrorism Post-9/11." In in Howard, Russell D. and Forest, James J.F. (eds.) *Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (McGraw-Hill, 2007) p. 273-274

Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma

By Jeffrey Kaplan

The Theory

When Professor David Rapoport gave me the opportunity to read an early draft of his groundbreaking four waves theory of modern international terrorism, I was immediately taken with it. [1] For a scholar trained as a cultural historian, how could it be otherwise? What Dr. Rapoport had done in essence was distill a lifetime of study into a single article that identified a unifying global *zeitgeist* that linking terrorist movements on a global scale which had in most instances never been in direct contact with one another. These organizations, cells or tiny “grouplets” or “groupuscules” as Roger Griffin would call the right wing version of these tiny terrorist bands [2] had previously been examined individually or reduced to the level of pawns in the hands of one of the global superpowers. [3] Rapoport's theory called up memories of such cultural history classics as the lyrical Western *zeitgeists* that defined the waning stages of the medieval world in the writings of Johann Huizinga. [4] More recently, it echoed Arthur Schlesinger's observations on the cycles of American history as each generation turned from public activism to private acquisition. [5]

Rapoport's theory, first published on the web before finally finding a home in a printed anthology, posited four distinct waves of modern terrorism (anarchist, nationalist, 1960s leftist, and the current religious wave). Each wave had a precipitating event, lasted about 40 years before receding, and, with some overlap, faded as another wave rose to take center stage. Most terrorist groups would gradually disappear, a few (the Irish Republican Army for example) proved more durable. Rapoport's theory was elegant, simple, inclusive, and had a high degree of explanatory power. In short, it provides a good academic model. I was sold when I read it in rough form, and am no less convinced today. I work with it in my research and I teach it to successive generations of my students. But there was something I still needed to know.

Something seemed to be missing—the theory was simply too elegant and inclusive. Then it struck me. David Rapoport is a brilliant theorist with a global vision. I admire his brilliance, but have never sought to emulate it. I lack the ability for one thing, but on a much deeper level, grand visions have always struck me as being altogether too grand, for they often miss the exceptions and the exceptional. The small minutiae that make the world such a diverse and interesting place. Rapoport can peer out over reams of data and form them into a brilliant theory—to use an arboreal metaphor, he can see a vast forest and make sense of its intricate patterns by peering over the treetops. I am more like the metaphorical turtle idealized by the Daoist sage Chuang-tzu who is happier by far sunning himself on his back by the lake and wagging his tail happily in the mud in the depths of the forest [6] in which, to further strain the metaphor, I could never tell the forest from the trees. I am by nature a fieldwork scholar, always in search of the most exceptional, most exotic, growths in the most distant depths of the forest. In this spirit, I started to look more and more closely at both Rapoport's theory, and at the groups that comprised the various waves within that theory. In the course of this examination, I came up with some surprising findings—none of which contradicted the central theses of the theory itself—but which did suggest that at deeper levels of the undergrowth there was something interesting which Rapoport's global vantage point had missed.

The discovery was simply this: the four waves is a theory of international terrorism, but it does not account for groups that begin on an international wave—indeed, some such groups may even be the creations of foreign patrons or the result of foreign educations or the influence of foreign ideas or religious beliefs on founders of groups—but which for some reason have turned inward, cut ties to their international benefactors or ideological/religious bedfellows and sought to realize a utopian vision of a radically perfected society on the *local* level. The goal of such groups is the creation of a new man and a new woman comprising an ethnicity or tribal society that is the reconstitution of a lost “Golden Age” model or an entirely new world *in a single generation*. There have been such movements emerging from the various waves of Rapoport's theory, and ironically enough, despite their radical localism and rabid xenophobia, they share a sufficient *zeitgeist* to constitute a kind of wave of their own, thus I call them the Fifth Wave of Modern Terrorism. [7] They could, as the reader will see when the characteristics that comprise the fifth wave *zeitgeist* are considered, just as accurately be styled the undertow of modern terrorism. They are a much feared force in the modern world.

The precursor of the modern fifth wave was the Khmer Rouge in the era *before* they took power in Cambodia. The genocidal actions of the Khmer Rouge, once the instruments of state power were in their control, were predictably based on both their stated ideology and their activities in areas of the countryside under their control well before they marched into Phnom Penh in 1975.[8] This would establish the precise genesis of the fifth wave as 1963, the year that the mercurial Prince Norodom Sihanouk, giving in to American pressure, outlawed the Cambodian Communist Party. The Party splintered, and was taken over by a radical faction of foreign-educated intellectuals led by Saloth Sar, who under the name Pol Pot would become synonymous with the genocide in the renamed Kampuchea after 1975.[9]

In common with Rapoport’s theory, the fifth wave, like the four that preceded it, now had a precise origin and a catalyzing event. Technically, the Khmer Rouge graduated from being an oppositional terrorist movement to a full fledged practitioner of regime terror with their capture of Phnom Penh in 1975, and thus could no longer be properly analyzed as a terrorist movement. [10] With their defeat by the Vietnamese in 1979, the fifth wave, like Rapoport’s second wave, saw an almost two decade long time lag between the disappearance of the Khmer Rouge - who served as the early avatar of the fifth wave - and the emergence of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, which was the first fully fledged modern fifth wave movement and the movement that remains as close to a pure case of fifth wave terrorism as we are able to document today.

What composes an ideal case of fifth wave terror? I argue that such a case would have all of the following characteristics:

Characteristics of Fifth Wave Groups[11]

1.	Radicalize and break away from established terrorist wave
2.	Born of hope expressed at the extremes: some emerge after all hope has been lost, others because the dream
3.	Physical withdrawal into wilderness areas
4.	Claim to establish some form of a new calendar (‘the Year Zero’)
5.	Radical quest for purity—racial, tribal, ecological, etc.
6.	Internal compromise impossible resulting in deadly schisms and constant internal violence
7.	Belief in human perfectibility and chiliastic utopia <i>in this lifetime</i>
8.	Emphasis on creating new men and women makes old models expendable; thus the logic of genocidal vio-
9.	Obsession with creating new race places tremendous emphasis on women, who are both subject and object of
10	Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the least contaminated by the old society (not to men-
11	Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave
12	Violence is so pervasive in the fifth wave that it loses its message content beyond the simple assertion that ‘we
13	The effects of ritualized acts of rape and killing, especially for newly abducted ‘recruits’, has the liminal effect of binding the killers to the group while closing the doors for all group members to a return to family, the old society, and previous ways of life
14	Fifth wave groups are localistic and particularistic, having turned their backs on the international waves from which they emerged
15	Nonetheless, if needed for survival, foreign allies will be cultivated and fifth wave groups will often live in
16	Authoritarian in nature with charismatic leadership patterns
17	Chiliastic in nature, deeply religious with eclectic or syncretic religious tropes assembled and interpreted by the leaders in support of a millenarian dream to be realized through a campaign of apocalyptic violence

But in the real world, ideal cases are hard to find and, in a closely related observation, not all variables are of equal importance. For the fifth wave, rape is the signature tactic and the most clearly identifiable characteristic. Rape thus serves the same function as suicide bombing does for the fourth wave. Why this should be is not difficult to explain.

One begins with geography and culture. The Lord’s Resistance Army emerged from the Acholi tribe which was

in the midst of unprecedented crisis. Indeed, its more precise roots were in the highly idiosyncratic militia that was created by the no less idiosyncratic prophetess of the Acholi based Holy Spirit Movement, Alice Auma (who took the name Alice Lakwena in honor of the spirit for whom she claimed to speak). [12] The Holy Spirit Movement gave birth to a militia, the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF). The HSMF was formed from the remnants of earlier Acholi militias that, having failed in any military sense of the word, had turned feral and preyed upon their own unfortunate Acholi tribe. The HSMF, following its 20 biblically based safety rules, [13] succeeded for a time in protecting the Acholi from both internal and external enemies.

The Acholi, in common with tribal cultures throughout Africa and the Middle East, find rape a particularly shameful act for which the primary onus falls on the woman, and the secondary shame on her family, clan and tribe in that order. [14] The act of rape in tribal conflict carries multivocalic messages to its target audiences. It may be used as a tool of ethnic cleansing or it may be used as a form of genocide on the cheap. It may be used in the fifth wave to harvest babies just as it may be used to break a woman's (or more often, a very young girl's) ties to family, society and tribe. [15] Rape in the fifth wave thus becomes ritualistic and yet deeply utilitarian.

Women are at the center of the violence of the fifth wave as both actors and victims, and children are the prize over whom the fifth wave's fight is ultimately waged. Accordingly, the Lord's Resistance Army would cease to exist if not for children. An estimated 90% of its fighters are child soldiers, and child brides are the chief reward to trusted senior officers in the movement and the primary commodity of exchange between them. [16] In the Rwanda genocide, one of the first defendants to be convicted of rape as a war crime was a woman—the former Minister of Family and Women's Affairs no less—Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. [17]

These children are born to fight or merely to be the physical embodiment of the superiority of one tribal or militia group over another. Or more grandly, they may be seen as the living symbols of the looming extinction of a rival tribe or race. In all cases however, they are the key to creating a new world in a single generation. It is they who are least contaminated by the corrupted ways of the old world and most open to the dreams of the charismatic visionaries who lead fifth wave movements.

The Lord's Resistance Army so well fit the ideal case scenario of the fifth wave that it was clear that the task to come would not be so easy. For the LRA was well studied, and well documented. It had been long established that a number of escapees—ranging from children to senior officers—were able to provide international organizations and human rights groups of every description with well documented testimony of the inner workings of the movement and the words and actions of its leader/prophet, Joseph Kony.[18] Other militias and tribally-based fighters in Africa bear a strong family resemblance to the fifth wave as defined above. However, they are not nearly as well documented.

The Conundrum

Of these fifth wave-like groups, none so closely matches the model or so completely captured my attention as has the so-called Janjaweed fighters in the Sudanese province of Darfur. It was my immersion in the formulation of fifth wave theory that brought my research focus increasingly to center on the Janjaweed. This was in many ways a natural outcome of my long-time fascination with the country. After four visits to the Sudan, an MA thesis based on the findings of the first of these trips, and a good deal of travel throughout the country in good times and bad, I am something of a "Sudanophile". This is a condition common to visitors to that country which will be taken up again in the conclusion to this paper. With this admission, I could not deny the fact that the Janjaweed seemed to follow the model of the fifth wave closely enough to merit using them as a test case for the theory. This led to the discovery of an interesting conundrum.

The conundrum lies in the fact that perhaps no conflict in modern times has generated such heated debate, such humanitarian passions, and most relevant to this study, such a mountain of literature. The sheer volume of available material on the Sudan case dwarfs that available for the Lord's Resistance Army. The reports emanating from international agencies and NGOs alone, printed out, form a mountain of paper higher than one's knees. Two quite good monographs have appeared on the subject, [19] as well as a host of lesser works written by impassioned activists who have been connected with aid work in Darfur of one sort or another. [20] The UN has weighed in with an excellent report and a film that has deeply impacted my own students, [21] and the *Washington Post* has done some first class video journalism available on the web that really brings home to anyone who has been in the Darfur region in better days the red, sandy world upon which the human tragedy of

the conflict is unfolding as well as powerful interviews with victims of Janjaweed violence.[22] Hollywood actors and rock stars vie with each other to make filmed documentaries or to stage benefit concerts for the victims of the Janjaweed's violent assaults. [23]

Here specifically lies the conundrum. Reams of papers, news articles, reports, interviews, television and internet documentaries, videos and films of very description record in minute detail the very real suffering of the victims of the Janjaweed. But from the Janjaweed themselves, with the exception of occasional high profile Janjaweed commanders such as Musa Hilal residing conveniently in luxurious abodes in suddenly oil rich Khartoum, there is a deafening silence. [24]

The Janjaweed are a ghost, or more accurately, a golem, who have been reified by the West into the quintessential manifestation of evil in the modern world. That no one has actually spoken to the Janjaweed rank and file at any length or in any depth, that no one has lived in their camps and sat around the evening fire with them, makes it all the easier to demonize them in this way.

This observation is hardly meant as an apologia for Janjaweed actions—which are well documented and unconscionable by Western or—of far greater moment in my view—by Islamic standards. Rather, it raises a much deeper set of questions. On the surface level of inquiry, what is it about the Darfur case which singles it out for such unique attention from the world community, from governments, from human rights organizations and from popular opinion makers?

Popular opinion may point to the extravagant violence of the Janjaweed and activists may focus more narrowly on the prevalence of rape as a Janjaweed tactic of choice. Scholars might point to the implications of the draught and the resultant drastic diminishment of natural resources in a fragile ecosystem which, with global warming, bodes ominously for other areas of the globe. Political scientists or area specialists might point to the number of state actors whose designs on the region made the Kalashnikov, in the redolent phraseology of the Musa Sadr, the Vanished Imam of another much penetrated polity, Lebanon, truly the necessary “adornments of men”. [25] And the cynic can dismiss the whole hubbub with a single word: ‘oil’. [26]

One could hardly go wrong by taking the safe and easy option and finding that all of these interests are in part what has driven Darfur to the top of the global human rights agenda. One might add that technology—the transmittal of the victim's stories, the graphic vision of burning villages offered by Google Maps, [27] the well publicized (but technically inaccurate) claim by President George W. Bush that what is happening in Darfur constitutes a “genocide” [28]—all of these technology driven factors have brought the suffering of the Janjaweed's many victims into our living rooms.

But at a much deeper level, and by far the more important question, is this: who exactly are the *Janjaweed*? Not as a collectivity, but as individuals. How did they become the much demonized “devils on horseback”? And at the deepest level of all: is there something we can learn from the answers to these questions that will help to minimize or prevent future Janjawees?

On the great scale of things, it doesn't amount to much when weighed against such bulky issues as genocide, ethnic cleansing, or the massive physical and sexual violence that marks the Janjaweed case. But even if it is a small thing, it is a very meaningful issue to me. Are the Janjaweed in fact a fifth wave terrorist group, or are they something quite else? For all the mountains of material written about them, we can make no more than inferences—educated guesses—at this point. To find out with certainty, it will be necessary to actually talk to them.

To begin to approach these issues however, we must start with a history of the Janjaweed. What follows then is a brief history drawn from a wide variety of sources and written at a sufficient level of generality that neophytes to the issue will hopefully come away with a useful amount of background, while specialists will only wince a minimal number of times.

The Janjaweed: A Creation Epic

Two of the three crises that would eventually lead to the creation of the Janjaweed have already been noted. The first was the draught and environmental crisis which began to impact the lives of Darfurian tribes in 1985-1986 through the process of desertification in Northern Darfur. [29] With the sudden competition for resources

that had formerly been more or less adequate to support both settled and nomadic tribes, came the opportunity for inroads by outsiders, and thus was born the infamous “Kalashnikov culture” of the late 1980s and early 1990s. [30] Then, inevitably, in 2003 there came the rebellion. The rebellion, based in the sedentary “African” tribes of Darfur in which the Fur played leading roles, was based on a discontent that was long brewing and which transcended Darfur.

It has never been much of a secret that since its independence in 1956, the Sudan has been ruled by, and for the exclusive profit of, a core group of reverine Arab tribes centered on the confluence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers (i.e., in the modern Khartoum/Omdermann area). The injustices of the Sudanese system were most striking in the South, where for almost fifty years the southern Nilotic tribes fought government forces in a series of wars known as the Anya Naya wars. Their perseverance would eventually lead to the American brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which took effect in January 2005 which included a mechanism for oil revenue sharing between North and South and an autonomous Southern government, as well as a referendum on secession which will take place in 2011, [31] It is therefore not surprising that Darfur’s African resistance groups formed and used the arms that had flooded the region with the objective of securing a piece of the CPA for themselves.

The grievances of all parties, “African” and “Arab” in Darfur, were neatly encapsulated in the first volume of the anonymously written *Black Book (kitab al-aswad)*. [32] Probably written by students of the Islamic scholar Hassan al-Turabi, the appearance of the *Black Book* had a seismic effect on its readers by demonstrating in dry graphs, facts and figures the degree to which the vast provincial regions of the Sudan had been marginalized to the profit of the ruling elite *before* the discovery of significant oil wealth in the country.

The dramatic appearance of the *Black Book* catalyzed a number of factors which were present in the so-called “African” communities. These included: 1) the appeal of radical Islam (al-Qaeda in a very real sense was born in the Sudan and radical Islam had a small but important following throughout that nation); 2) the success of “fellow Africans” in the South in their struggle with the “Arabs” of the North; 3) the availability of weapons and young fighters with no better choices in life than to wield those weapons; and 4) the all pervasive allure of the easy wealth of oil. The inevitable result was the birth of two major African liberation movements; the Sudan Liberation Army/Front (SLA/M) and the more Islamist oriented Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 1993. With that, the Darfur conflict had its formal beginning.

Before moving to the Arab Bedouin tribes from whom the Janjaweed were recruited, it is necessary to pause and share one of Sudan’s “dirty little secrets”. It was actually no secret—nothing in the Sudan is really a secret—but its magnitude has been underestimated in the West. The core of the Sudanese Army has always relied on Darfurian tribes for its junior rank officers and much of its enlisted personnel. Young men in Khartoum and Omdurman have more promising careers to which to aspire, while young men in the South have been engaged for half a century in fighting the Sudanese Army. Many sources have noted the defections of elements of the Sudanese Army and Air Force, but in conversation with Sudanese Ambassador to the United States John Ukek Lueth Ukek, I was informed that the government of General Bashir decided by 2004, the height of the rebellion, to cashier no less than 26,000 Darfurian troops from the regular Army.[33] They of course had nowhere better to go than to the resistance. Worse, the decision left the Sudanese government with the unpalatable choice of moving troops from the critical Southern front to help quell the rebellion (many of whom were of course also Darfurian and willing to kill Dinka or Nuer, but not so willing to kill their own kinsmen), or negotiating with resistance leaders from a position of weakness. Instead, the government chose a fateful third course which, while militarily successful, has brought with it a very high political price. These were the birthpangs of the Janjaweed.

The young men who would answer the call to join the quasi-governmental militia that would be called (by its victims) Janjaweed, like the “African” rebels, had undergone their own period of radicalization. They too were aware of the *Black Book*’s contents, even if literacy was not among their strong points. Bedouin society remains, as it always has been, an oral culture. For the Arab tribes, as the competition for resources grew sharper, an intellectual discourse that came to be known as the “Arab Gathering” was what galvanized “Arab” passions.

The Arab Gathering left few documents save some newspaper articles and a few vitriolic and very hard to find pamphlets. The power of the spoken word in an oral culture is too often underestimated by Western observers. The Arab Gathering, which had more than a little backing from both Libyan sources and from the Sudanese government, was both a *Da’wa* (Islamic Call or Revivalist) ideology and, since it was the “African” tribes against whom the Arab Gathering expended considerable vitriol, it was an explicitly racist ideology as well.

This brings to the surface another of those “dirty little Sudanese secrets” that has amazed and either amused or appalled generations of white visitors to what is truly the most hospitable country on the face of the earth.

The Sudanese are acutely conscious of the color of each others’ skin and use skin tone as a marker of status in Sudanese society. Students of Africa are well used to the overwhelming importance of tribal affiliation in African politics, and tribe is no less important in the Sudan. But to this tribal consciousness is added in many Sudanese minds a color consciousness which creates subtle but important status differentiations which the outsider is hard pressed to understand. Put bluntly, the differences in complexion are not all that great, and at times are, for outsiders, almost imperceptible. But the Sudanese have a finely tuned eye for these nuances and thus the often crude appeals of the Arab Gathering, given the sudden dearth of resources and the maximal competition for what was available in the face of the relentless process of desertification, fell on very fertile ground among young Arab males with few other options in life.[34]

Who were these young men who would respond to the Sudanese government’s call for volunteers to fight alongside (but significantly, not within) the ranks of the Sudanese Army against the rebel groups and their tribal kinsmen in Darfur? Gérard Prunier provides the best description of the early Janjaweed available:

...the Janjaweed seem to have been of six main origins: former bandits and highwaymen who had been ‘in the trade’ since the 1980s; demobilized soldiers from the regular army; young members of Arab tribes having a running land conflict with a neighboring “African” group—most appeared to be members of the smaller Arab tribes, common criminals who were paroled and released from gaol if they joined the militia; fanatical members of the Tajammu al-Arabi [lit. ‘Union of the Arabs’ or commonly Arab Gathering]; and young unemployed ‘Arab’ men, quite similar to those who joined the rebels on the ‘African side’.[35]

They also were paid handsomely for their efforts, often more than the regular Sudanese Army recruits. [36]

Some of these recruits fought under the leadership of their traditional tribal and clan chiefs. The case of Musa Hilal, the best known voice of the Janjaweed in the Western press who, upon the death of Hilal Abdala became Nazir (Supreme Chief) of the Um Jalul clan, is paradigmatic. More commonly, recruits were thrown together regardless of tribe or clan, armed, and given some basic training at military camps. All published sources agree that the Janjaweed were originally armed and trained by the Government of Sudan (GOS), with units of the Army, the intelligence services and the Air Force deeply involved in the Janjaweed’s formation and early successes. [37] Early military operations were also conducted jointly with GOS military forces.

By 2004, the ferocity of the Janjaweed, backed by Sudanese air power, had turned the tide of battle. Indeed, “African” towns and villages were reduced to rubble and their inhabitants reduced to the status of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Early Janjaweed operations prominently featured very public examples of mass rape, following which the male relatives who had been forced to helplessly watch the shameful spectacle were massacred. [38] It was ugly, and the world turned against the Sudan in helpless disgust, but the GOS spearheaded by their Janjaweed militia allies had regained control of what was left of the province and have held it ever since. Indeed, for the next year and a half, an odd kind of stasis set in where IDP camps would be set up, while smaller more temporary camps of Janjaweed would be formed outside the perimeters of the IDP camps where Janjaweed could prey on women forced to leave the relative safety of the camps to gather water or firewood. Sudanese military bases would secure the perimeters of these inhabited areas to control the flow of refugees and the movements of NGOs or African Union peacekeepers, and the Arab nomadic tribes would continue to ply their seasonal migratory paths.

The Janjaweed after 2004 gained an increasing measure of independence, and with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 there were definite signs of diminishing support for the Janjaweed by the central government. There were even reports of armed clashes between Janjaweed and GOS forces. Be this as it may, the Janjaweed continued to operate with virtual impunity and attacks on population centers began to take on a definite pattern as Janjaweed fighters began to take over abandoned settlements and claim them as their own. [39] With this, the logic of diminished resources, abundant weapons and a racist ideology which channeled age-old competition between settled and nomadic populations into a lethal hatred supported by the power of a modern state came full circle. The circle closed in 2007 as the relatively static situation dissolved into chaos on both the “African” and “Arab” sides. What is happening on the ground now in Darfur follows the deadly logic of African tribal conflicts enacted on a grand and bloody scale as they play out against the backdrop of global politics, the politics of oil, and the relentless politicking of the NGOs. It is, in a word,

chaos.

For those interested in the fascinating minutia of the situation, both Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have produced excellent, detailed reports on the subject. [40] For our purposes, suffice to say that all Arab belligerents have brought tribal kinsmen into Darfur claiming them to have historic rights to the abandoned lands under Janjaweed control (some from as far as the Central African Republic), while Chad has pushed vast numbers of Arab tribesmen who have rebelled against either the Chadian government or become embroiled with Chadian President Idris Déby's Zagawa tribe (which has been at the center of the violence in Darfur as well) and has most recently followed them across the border with bombing raids and military strikes. [41] To add to the chaos, African Union peacekeepers were attacked, probably by JEM fighters or defectors (depending on whose story one finds credible). [42] Naturally, given such chaotic conditions, the Arab tribes have begun to fight each other, which has induced the Janjaweed to return to fight alongside their own clansmen and, in the resultant atmosphere of disappointment and betrayal *vis a vis* the central government, new and interesting linkages have emerged between "Arab" and "African" tribes at the expense of GOS forces. [43]

Meanwhile, a series of attacks on NGO aid workers (trucks were hijacked, 66 men were shot and women were raped by May 2007) caused the withdrawal of NGOs from the region. [44] Aid workers now come in only by helicopter and remain on the ground for only a few heavily guarded hours at a time. The "African" liberation movements, fueled by unlikely but pervasive rumors of an imminent breakthrough at the peace negotiations currently floundering in Libya, the even more unlikely dream of US\$10,000 compensation to any family on the ground, and integration into the national army for demobilized militia fighters, have multiplied from a mere few to nineteen squabbling groupuscules, making the process of negotiation all the more impossible. [45]

As the New Year of 2008 dawns, Darfur is a bigger mess than ever. And after fifteen years of active war, we still know next to nothing about the Janjaweed rank and file. Darfur has only become more dangerous, and the situation has become more intractable.

The Dilemma

The core of the dilemma is this: not only do we know virtually nothing of the Janjaweed fighters, if truth be told we know precious little about what goes through the minds of such men anywhere in the world at the moment when they are actively involved in the act of genocide or ethnic cleansing (the difference, to give President Bush the benefit of the doubt, is more in intent than in action in any case). This leaves us with controversial and often highly polemical reconstructions of events long past. [46] Or, equally unsatisfying to Western scholars ground in a tradition that reveres the peer reviewed written word, it leaves us at the mercy of the infinite malleability of memory, as reflected in the frustrations experienced by the those engaged in the current academic cottage industry of conducting prison interviews with those jailed for participation in the genocidal violence of such places as Rwanda or Sierra Leone. [47] In such interviews, almost to a man, the prisoners deny having themselves participated in the act of rape, although, with reluctance, some will admit to having witnessed "others" among their number commit such crimes. This historical revision would surprise no one who has worked with oral histories in any depth, nor would it come as a particular shock to anyone familiar with the repugnance for rape commonly held by African cultures. Given time, it is simply edited out of the perpetrators' memories. And who is to say that this lapse of memory is not real? We often forget that which is too painful to bear in active memory.

If the memories of perpetrators in other African conflicts find gender based violence too problematic to deal with, how much more so must be the case of the Janjaweed? These after all are Muslims whose radicalization process included the rhetoric of radical Islam through the Arab Gathering and, if Flynt and De Waal's brief fieldwork is to be credited, Islamic apocalypticism as well. [48] In the times of Jahiliyyah - the days of pre-Islamic darkness before the coming of the Prophet and the Revelation of the Qu'ran - gender based violence was the norm in Arabia. Young men proved their worthiness as men by participation in the *gazwa* or raid in which the kidnapping of a female of reproductive age was the highest prize. Female infanticide was a common practice among the poor. The Prophet gave women legal standing for the first time. He anathemized the *gazwa* when aimed at fellow Muslims and ended the practice of female infanticide. [49]

Not only the Janjaweed, but their victims too are Muslim. What prize, what dream, what desperation would move a man to act toward the destruction of his own soul? What earthly future does such a man have, given the African belief in the power of unrequited spirits who have the power to blight the fortunes of families, clans

and entire tribes if the proper rituals are not performed to put their spirits to rest? Such is the magnitude of Janjaweed violence that the dead victims of the militia can not be accurately counted, much less laid to rest or propitiated. As to the women who have been raped and yet live, many have been quoted to the effect that they envy the dead, for their lives as members of their families, clans and tribes are over. Traditional married life, childbearing and the ability to fulfill the roles for which women in African societies are raised to idealize are closed to them. [50] They are ghosts who haunt their living kin as unbearable reminders of their own impotence to protect them.

These women may be ghosts, but they are unquiet spirits. Virtually the whole of the vast pile of reports and articles noted at the beginning of this article are victim testimonies. Victim testimonies are moving and powerful. They are vital pieces of history and need to be collected, both for their historical value, and for their evidentiary value as international law has evolved to the point where rape in wartime is no longer seen as an unavoidable form of collateral damage but a fully fledged war crime in itself. [51]

But for all the power and eloquence of victim testimony, what a victim can never tell you—and what we must know if policies are to be crafted to prevent future Janjaweeds; future Darfurs—is the answer to the most basic question of all: Why? Why do (note the present tense) you do it? What are you thinking? What do you see and what do you dream? What pictures are in your mind when you close your eyes to sleep and what do you see at first light? How did you get here and where do you go from here when the conflict ends? There is no going home for your victims, but for you too the door to a normal life seems to be closed. Has the militia replaced or does it in some way exist uneasily alongside your tribal identity?

And having asked these, what are the questions which would prove or disprove with certainty the hypothesis that the Janjaweed are a fifth wave terrorist group? These would include:

- 1) **Localism.** Are the issues contested purely local, tribal and thus regional? Or, in keeping with the Islamic discourse in which Janjaweed rhetoric is couched, is there a global dimension to the Janjaweed dream?;
- 2) **Racism.** Is the violence an expression of mere racial animus, or is there something deeper, or perhaps something more practical like acquisition of land or physical resources?;
- 3) **Historical Continuity.** Is the Janjaweed phenomenon simply a continuation of the traditional enmity between Arab nomads and African settled pastoralists, exacerbated by the drought of the 1980s, the onset of the “Kalashnikov culture” and the politically expedient decision to arm the nomadic tribes rather than trust the loyalty (or ability) of the Army to deal with the rebellion of 1993, or does the Janjaweed phenomenon represent more of a millennial or existential dream?;
- 4) **Ijtihad?** [52] Have Janjaweed leaders used this forbidden form of exegesis (for Sunnis) to make Janjaweed actions compatible with Islamic text?;
- 5) **Social Structure.** What kind of social structures developed in Janjaweed camps, including the possible development of new or revived (and revised) religious rituals or the use of narcotic drugs prior to going into battle?;
- 6) **Gender.** Is the pervasive rape perpetrated by the Janjaweed intended as: a strategy of genocide, as a terrorist message aimed at the ethnic cleansing of the region; or is it mere opportunistic criminal violence—a matter of gender and power and profound social change?; and
- 7) What is the role of the **Hakama**, [53] female traditional singers, in exacerbating sexual violence in Darfur.

Given the situation on the ground in Darfur, such research would be much more difficult to conduct now than it would have been just a year or two ago. Moreover, the enterprise is fraught with ethical dilemmas for the researcher who would undertake such a project.

Afterword and Postscript all Rolled Into One: Ethics and Janjaweed Research

In the last analysis, fifth wave theory is just that; a theory. It focuses on societies at the verge of collapse, which produce terrorist movements with millennial dreams of remaking their people anew in a single generation. To accomplish this, the only logical avenue of action leads to sexual violence—rape on the grand scale—which is directed primarily at ethnic or tribal kin.

From the vantage point of the outsider, the violence appears dispiritingly familiar. Like post-Cold War conflicts from Yugoslavia to Rwanda, it appears a savage throwback to an earlier time and the prevalence of rape in these conflicts is explained as simply “a product of the times” or a “byproduct of war which can no longer be tolerated”. However, to know whether a terrorist group involved in such violence is a product of the fifth wave of modern terrorism as it has been defined in this paper can not be ascertained with certainty from afar unless that campaign has been relatively long-lived and has left a considerable oral or written “paper trail” of insider accounts documenting the goals, visions and dreams of its leaders and those of its rank and file members. The Khmer Rouge recorded everything in painstaking (if often deadening) detail. The Lord’s Resistance Army’s defectors and escapees have provided a vivid picture of Joseph Kony and the millennialist dreams of that movement. Both can be posited with a high degree of certainty to be fifth wave entities. The case of the Janjaweed is less clear. They write nothing, for theirs is an oral culture, and the Sudanese government support has given little incentive for Janjaweed fighters to defect.

To determine whether the Janjaweed are a fifth wave terrorist group—and more, to better gauge the importance and validity of fifth wave theory itself, fieldwork is necessary. But this is more easily said than done. No independent academic researcher has, to my knowledge, attempted to conduct a research project at the height of a campaign of genocide or ethnic cleansing “embedded” (to use an Iraq War mediaism) with the perpetrators of the atrocities. As we have noted, research comes later, often *much* later. In African conflicts like that in Darfur which leave few written documents and where history is recorded in the minds and hearts of men, the truth becomes malleable and history self-serving. Essentially then, in ethical terms, such a project would be operating on a kind of *terra incognita*.

Recently, a nascent discussion has begun on the ethics of doing research in war zones. [54] There is of course considerable literature –mostly originating from military sciences - dealing with ethics in war, but these do not really speak to civilian researchers in war zones. NGOs have rules for their employees operating in conflict areas and these may provide some helpful guidance, but NGOs are organizations. The academic researcher, by the nature of his or her work, operates alone. Moreover, were I to undertake such a research project, I would employ a form of participant/observer methodology that the Sociologist of Religion Thomas Robbins has dubbed the “Interpretive Approach”.[55] The Interpretive Approach involves intensive fieldwork based on extended residence with the research subject within the subject’s own community, and often, within his or her own home. It includes immersion in the literature, written or oral, and aims to be able to produce for the reader, as accurately as possible, a vision of the world—this world and the next—as seen “through the eyes of the other”. This methodology provides readers with the beliefs and motivations which drive violent and seemingly irrational actions, within the historical and sociological contexts of the belief systems and cultural milieus under study.

While my basic research approach will not change, I hold no illusions. The Janjaweed, Darfur and the Sudan present unique and potentially far more dangerous challenges than any of my previous work. However, I have spent a good deal of time in the Sudan, [56] having been there on four occasions and know the country well. I have no doubt that the research, despite its formidable challenges, would be successful. Yet there is no getting around the fact that such a course of research raises some critical ethical issues. I have experienced a few of these in much milder forms in the past, and dealt with them in previous publications. But it

also raises issues of a deeper, more searing nature, the responses to which I cannot now, in all candor, completely predict. [57]

First the easy question: is it ethical to even speak with perpetrators—to publish their views and ideas as if they held equal moral weight with the testimonies of victims? The question is valid, and I would respond in this way. Victim testimony is vital and compelling on a variety of fronts, but as we have noted, victims can never explain *why* a perpetrator acted as he or she did. And it is precisely this information that policy makers most require.

In my past publications, I have dealt with many of the most feared pariah groups of Western society and found, sometimes to my surprise, that spark, however dim, of humanity that connects even the most feared and demonized of perpetrators to the human race. In one of my publications, I put that moment of recognition in these terms:

If this finding could be given a name, it would be this: the shock of shared humanity. And in truth, this bothered me greatly. How could such people be so much like us? And why would this seem so obvious to me, and so opaque to the wider culture and the academic world alike? Surely I felt, the problem must lie with me. It was at this point that I seriously thought of finding some other avenue of research.

It was at this nadir that a colleague and good friend, Doug Milford of Wheaton College in Illinois, made an off-hand observation that would in a significant way change the course of my work. Wheaton is a Christian college and Doug himself is a devout evangelical Christian. Thus, when he observed in the context of suggesting that perhaps aspects of my research... would be better left untouched—that the real problem was that I had been given a gift of discernment which allowed me to find, at the deepest level, the spark of goodness, of humanity, in even the most lost of souls, it caused me to reflect deeply on the implications of the idea.

In the evangelical worldview, evil is a literal, ever-present reality in the world. And discernment is understood as one of the gifts of the spirit which God grants to allow the faithful to discern between truth and deception. Thus the force of the idea. This after all is at the core of all of the great religious traditions. In Judaism, it is conceived as the Sacred Spark and in Christianity it is the human soul. In Buddhism, it is the Buddha nature. But by any name, and in any tradition, it is the power of discernment, the search for the core of humanity and the spark of the divine, that unites us all in the human family. And it is this universal truth of the oneness of all human creation which we so often forget in dealing with those with whom most violently disagree. It is this recognition of shared humanity which is so lacking in the popular constructions of the radical right, and it is precisely the lack of this recognition of shared humanity that allows for the creation of the imaginary monsters of *terra incognita*. There are real world implications of all this. [58]

The second set of ethical questions raised by such a project is beyond my experience, and thus not so easily answered. I have in my life been in active conflict zones. I have seen people hurt, and I have seen people killed. It is sometimes not easy to live with these memories, but the violence of the Janjaweed is on another scale of magnitude altogether. The proposed research is unique in its conception. In particular, the kind of sexual violence associated with the Janjaweed is, to virtually all of us in the Western world, unimaginable. The ethical issues arising from mere proximity, much less giving witness, to such atrocities are immense, and immensely hard to fathom. The normal ethical codes in doing participant observer research—protection of research subjects, anonymity when requested, and the like which are best articulated in the Anthropological Association literature have always governed my field-work ethics. Yet the Janjaweed presents unique moral and ethical dilemmas and unique legal issues.

I have thought deeply about these issues, and have begun to consult with colleagues in a number of fields about the ethical and legal issues and responsibilities that could arise from this research. Fortunately, as a member of the Executive Board and Book Review Editor for the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*, I have a wide network of colleagues in a number of academic disciplines, as well as government and security officials and members of NGOs from around the world to draw upon. Each of these colleagues in turn has global networks of their own with which to consult on these issues. At this point, I have no answers, only questions.

Which points up the unique interactive value of an on-line journal like *Perspectives on Terrorism* where the ideas and views of a number of colleagues can be sought on the viability, as well as the ethics, of a research project of this nature. I very much invite comment either in the journal's private Article Discussion Forum or (preferably) by private email on this article, and on the wider ideas that it raises in terms of the viability and ethical standards of such research.

Finally, why would anyone want to undertake such research? The answer is simple enough, and best elucidated by the great scholar and statesman of the Sudan, Prof. Francis Deng, who in turn borrowed it from a Western scholar who has studied the Sudan for many years, Prof. Robert O. Collins:

It really does not matter what particular government is in power—parliamentarian, military or Islamist—it is the daily encounters with the warmth, charm and friendliness of Sudanese of every ethnicity I have known which makes them unique among the people of the world. I have asked myself many times what makes them so affectionate, helpful and hospitable, and I have no answer. I do not know that I can recall any Westerner who has not established a deep affection for the Sudanese while at the same time cursing the 'bloody country'. I have never found anyone who can produce a satisfactory answer for his love of the Sudanese that appears an irrational emotion so common among expatriates that is jokingly called the incurable disease of 'Sudanitis'... [59]

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NOTES:

[1] The published version is David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2004), 46-73.

[2] Roger Griffin, "Net Gains and GUD Reactions : Patterns of Prejudice in a Neo-fascist Groupuscule," *Patterns of Prejudice* 33: 2 (1 April 1999), 31-50.

[3] Most famously as the dreaded Moscow based 'Terror Central' of Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981). For a more academic take on the Cold War theories of terrorism as centrally directed, see the anthology Uri Ra'anan and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy., *Hydra of Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations: The Witnesses Speak* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

[4] Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

[5] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "The Cycles of American Politics," in Arthur Meier Schlesinger, *The Cycles of American History* (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 23-50.

[6] "The complete Chuang Tzu based on the translation by James Legge (of 1890)." http://taoistresource.home.comcast.net/~taoistresource/0697_jl.htm.

[7] The full theory is explicated at length in Jeffrey Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 4 (2007): 545-70.

[8] For good sources, see for example David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, Westview Special Studies on South and Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975* (London: Verso, 1985), François Ponchaud, *Cambodia Year Zero* (London: Allen Lane, 1978).

[9] Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" 549.

[10] The pre-state Khmer Rouge is little discussed in the literature of terrorism, perhaps because of the enormity of the genocidal project which the movement was to undertake once in power. But I agree with Brice Hoffman and many others in asserting that terrorism is by definition oppositional in nature. Regimes exercise terror, oppositional movements may utilize terrorism as a tactic of opposition, owing to the asymmetrical nature of their struggle with states. For this argument, see Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 15-16.

[11] Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" 548.

[12] The best source on Alice Lakwena, who recently died in exile in Kenya, remains Heike Behrend, *Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 1985-97* (Oxford: Fountain Publishers, 1999). For two good obituaries of Alice Lakwena, see "Alice Lakwena," *Economist.com*, January 25, 2007, http://www.economist.com/obituary/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8584604&fsrc=nlwlehfrc; and "Alice Lakwena," *Timesonline*, January 24, 2007. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1295608.ece>.

[13] Which included such oddities for a militia as proscribing killing, forbidding its soldiers to take cover under fire, or to go into battle with any more or any less than two testicles; see *Ibid.*, 47.

[14] For relevant case studies, see for example Joanne Csete, Juliane Kippenberg, and Human Rights Watch (Organization), *The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 326-41; Christine Chinkin, "Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law," *European Journal of International Law* 5, no. 3 (1994), Human Rights Watch, "Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur," (Human Rights Watch, 2005), Amnesty International, "Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences," (2004).

[15] For example, Emily Wax, "'We Want to Make a Light Baby': Arab Militiamen in Sudan Said to Use Rape as Weapon of Ethnic Cleansing," *Washington Post*, June 30, 2004, 1.

[16] Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" 560.

[17] Peter Landesman, "A Woman's Work," *New York Times*, September 15, 2002. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9505EEDA1F3EF936A2575AC0A9649C8B63>.

[18] Human Rights Watch/Africa, and Human Rights Watch Children's Rights Project., *The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), 5-36; Ruddy Dorn and Koen Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (1999), Angela Veale and Aki Stavrou, "Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The Reintegration of Lord's Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda," (*Institute for Security Studies South Africa*, 2003), 1; George Omona and Karen Elise Matheson, "The Hidden Health Trauma of Child Soldiers," *Lancet*, 337-52; Anthony Vinci, "Existential Motivations in the Lord's Resistance Army's Continuing Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 4 (2007), 29-52; Paul Jackson, "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed of Grievance in Northern Uganda?" *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13, no. 3 (2002). To name but a few.

[19] Julie Flint and Alexander De Waal, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2005), Gérard Prunier, *Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2005).

[20] Typical of this literature, and in fact one of the better examples, is Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace, *The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

[21] IRIN Special Report, "Our Bodies - Their Battle Ground: Gender-based Violence in Conflict Zones." The report and film can both be downloaded from <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=20&ReportId=62814>.

[22] <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/interactives/sudan/>.

[23] To take just one Hollywood example from my generation, Mia Farrow at <http://www.miafarrow.org/>. Hotter by far, and available in a plethora of languages, see Angelina Jolie's Darfur journals <http://www.elros.altervista.org/aj/ajindex.htm>. And I suppose balance demands the inclusion of George Clooney's adventures in Sudan and Chad, which can be viewed directly on Youtube <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFVlHsaq5yg>. On the Rock for Darfur tour, see <http://www.myspace.com/rockfordarfur>.

[24] The point is made well in Human Rights Watch, Watch, "Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur." (2005).

[25] The exact quote was "arms are the adornments of men," and Imam Musa used it in the context of getting a large audience in a village to put down their weapons long enough to listen to his words, which were "stronger than bullets." By the end of the 1980s, to use Imam Musa's metaphor, the men of Darfur had learned the fine art of accessorization with the AK-47, which sold for less than \$40, the ultimate fashion statement. On Imam Musa, see Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). For a wonderful description of the coming of the Kalashnikov culture to Darfur, see Prunier, *Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide*.

[26] I well recall having recently returned to the US from many years in the Middle East to pursue my Ph.D. when I ran across a small article in the back of the *New York Times* noting that a significant amount of off-shore oil had been found in Sudanese waters. My thought that day, considerably redacted for publication, was, "Poor Sudanese (not the word used at the time, but in historical hindsight it will more than serve—a point about the flexibility of memory that has considerable relevance to this article), now on top of all their other problems they are going to have to have human rights." Indeed, within a month over thirty individual pieces of legislation were introduced in the US Congress criticizing the Sudanese government for its practices on human rights and religious liberties. Amazing how the denizens of oil states elicit a degree of sympathy that poor, war torn countries without oil—the Sudan for example—fail to elicit from states, and quite often, from the NGO community as well. On the legislative outpouring of crocodile tears for the plight of the Sudanese, see Walid Phares, "The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion," *Middle East Quarterly* V, no. 1 (1998): <http://www.meforum.org/article/383>.

[27] <http://humanrights4all-africa.blogspot.com/2007/04/google-maps-darfur-crisis.html>.

[28] "President Bush Discusses Genocide in Darfur, Implements Sanctions," Statement in White House Diplomatic Reception Room, May 29, 2007. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070529.html>. The situation in Darfur more closely resembles ethnic cleansing than genocide, with the Janjaweed acting as the tip of the spear aimed at the Fur and other sedentary tribes (the so-called "African tribes" in the press) and rape as the primary tool through which these target groups are being forced from their land. Once out of the way,

the Janjaweed have evinced little interest in following them or finding ways to exterminate them, which is ultimately what drives a genocidal campaign. On this topic, see for example Marnie McCuen, *The Genocide Reader: The Politics of Ethnicity and Extermination* (Hudson, Wis.: GEM Publications, 2000), Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004).

[29] Alexander De Waal, *Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan*, Rev. ed., Oxford Studies in African Affairs (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Cf. University for Peace, "Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur" (papers presented at the Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur, Conference in Khartoum, Sudan, December 2004), 101.

[30] The book that best documents the Libyan designs on Chad and its role of Darfur in those designs in the 1980s is Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2006). Unfortunately, the heart of the book is simply a reprint of Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Africa's Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963-1993* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999). The last two chapters cover the current crisis, but most of this material is taken from Flint and De Waal's text.

[31] On the CPA, see International Crisis Group, "The Khartoum-Splm Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace," in *Africa Report* N°96 (2005).

[32] The full text of the volume in translation can be found at http://www.sudanjem.com/sudan-alt/english/books/blackbook_part1/blackbook_part1_20040422_bbone.pdf. The second volume can be found on the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) website at <http://www.sudanjem.com/en/index.php>.

[33] Discussion with Ambassador Ukek in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 1 October 2007.

[34] Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, "Conflict, Camps and Coercion: The Continuing Livelihoods Crisis in Darfur Final Report," (World Food Program (WFP) Sudan, 2006). Cf. Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*, 49-57.

[35] Prunier, *Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide*, 97-98.

[36] *Ibid.*, 98.

[37] Both the Prunier and the Flint and De Waal monographs agree on this point. For more detailed information, see for examples:

"Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur," (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Human Rights Watch, "Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support," in Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2004). Ted Dagne and Bathsheaba Everett, "Sudan: The Darfur Crisis and the Status of the North-South Negotiations," ed. Congressional Research Service (CRS, 2004). "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General: Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004." Geneva, 25 January 2005. www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.

[38] IRIN, "Sudan: The Escalating Crisis in Darfur," (2003), Watch, "Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur," International., "Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences," Wax, "'We Want to Make a Light Baby': Arab Militiamen in Sudan Said to Use Rape as Weapon of Ethnic Cleansing," Alfred de, "Darfur Women Describe Gang-Rape Horror," ABC News 2007, Jen Marlowe et al., *Darfur Diaries: Stories of Survival* (New York: Nation Books, 2006), Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[39] Jaspars, "Conflict, Camps and Coercion: The Continuing Livelihoods Crisis in Darfur Final Report."

[40] International Crisis Group, "Darfur's New Security Reality," in *Africa Report* No. 134 (2007), Human Rights Watch, "Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design," (2007). The ICG report is more recent and is much recommended for its focus on tribal politics.

[41] "Chad Reiterates Determination to Pursue Rebels in Sudan," the Sudan Tribune, January 9, 2008. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25499>.

[42] "Darfur Attack Kills Peacekeepers," BBC News, 1 October 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7020596.stm>. And most recently, "Sudanese Troops Fire on UN Convoy in Darfur," Washington Post, January 9, 2008, 12.

[43] For the exquisitely complex details, see International Crisis Group, "Darfur's New Security Reality."

[44] For a detailed table of these incidents, see "Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Under Attack in Sudan," http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/darfur/table/ngo-table.aspx.

[45] Discussion with Ambassador Ukek in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 1 October 2007.

[46] See for one famous example Daniel Jonah Goldhagen et al., *The "Willing Executioners"/"Ordinary Men" Debate: Selections from the Symposium*, April 8, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Research Institute, 1996).

[47] Which is not to say that this work has not produced some superior scholarship. See for example Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

[48] Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*, 33.

[49] For a good, recent and wonderfully classroom friendly biography of the Prophet, see Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad: A Prophet for Our Time* (New York: Atlas Books/HarperCollins, 2006). Muhammad's threat was poetic justice to the core. He warned that any Muslim who killed a girl child would, upon his death, first see that child who would ask what she had done to deserve death? As in her innocence no answer could be posited, the unfortunate man would be whisked immediately to hell. It is important here to note the practicality of Islam. Female infanticide was a plague of the ancient world, East and West. Through the institution of an alms tax, Muhammad eliminated the economic necessity for such a practice and thus ended it within a generation—a remarkable achievement in the ancient world whose lesson is binding upon Muslims to this day.

[50] For attempts to heal the physical, and to some extent the psychological and spiritual wounds of such women, see especially the filmed version of the IRIN Special Report, "Our Bodies - Their Battle Ground: Gender-based Violence in Conflict Zones." Similarly, a woman interviewed in the Washington Post's Darfur video recounts who she was taken by ten Janjaweed, nine of whom raped her. She is pictured as alone and isolated and wishes aloud that they had simply killed her. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/interactives/sudan/>. Cf. Amnesty International, "Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences."

[51] Amnesty International, "Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War, Sexual Violence and Its Consequences." <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR540762004>. This source includes a discussion of the Hakama, the female singers whose songs goad Janjaweed fighters on to acts of sexual violence.

[52] Ijtihad is the interpretation of sacred text in light of current events. It was forbidden to Sunnis when the teachings of al-Ghazali (d. 1111) gradually 'closed the gates of ijtihad' in the twelfth century. Shi'ite scholars continue the practice, but only the most senior or their ranks are allowed to practice ijtihad. Arguably, the ultimate quest of modern radical Islamists is, on a theological level, to reopen the gates of ijtihad and to democratize its practice.

[53] The Hakama are an interesting case study in themselves, and a definite circumstantial indicator that the Janjaweed are indeed fifth wave actors. See Jeevan Vasagar and Ewen MacAskill, "Arab Women Singers Complicit in Rape, Says Amnesty Report," *Guardian*, July 20, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,14658,1264901,00.html>.

[54] Elizabeth Dauphinée, *The Ethics of Researching War: Looking for Bosnia*, New Approaches to Conflict Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).

[55] Thomas Robbins, "Religious Movements and Violence: A Friendly Critique of the Interpretive Approach," *Nova Religio* 1, no. 1

An Argument for Terrorism

By Richard Jackson [1]

It has become something of a cliché to note that there are over 200 definitions of terrorism in existence within broader terrorism studies literature; that many terrorism scholars have given up on the definitional debate and use the term unreflectively; and that such a state of affairs hampers theoretical progress and skews terrorism research in unhelpful ways. However, the significance and consequences of the definitional debate go far beyond such narrow academic confines, important as they are to the field. Rather, the issue of definition is central to the way in which the Global War on Terror is prosecuted by the authorities both domestically and overseas. It also affects the way in which terrorism is understood and dealt with as a criminal act under international and domestic law. In the academic and cultural realms, the definition of terrorism has important implications for the way knowledge and commonsense about the subject is constructed and reproduced socially. Furthermore, it has substantial indirect consequences for individuals and groups labelled as terrorists – who may then be legally subject to torture, rendition and internment without trial – and for the “suspect communities” they belong to.

This paper argues that despite a number of serious political and ontological obstacles to the definition of terrorism, it should be possible to agree on a clear set of criteria that can be employed to distinguish and conceptualise terrorism as a unique form of political violence. There are a great many advantages to adopting these definitional criteria. More importantly, there are political-normative imperatives for retaining “terrorism” as a central organising concept for the field. The paper begins by discussing some of the main challenges in defining terrorism and the kinds of knowledge practices this has resulted in to date. The second section outlines a set of criteria that analysts can employ to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence. The final section of the paper attempts to demonstrate how this approach to terrorism can play a role in strengthening rules and norms against illegitimate and oppressive forms of political violence, whether it is committed by state or non-state actors.

The Constitution of Terrorism

I have already noted that the definitional debate in terrorism studies has reached something of a stalemate. Not only is there no agreed definition among scholars, but an analysis of 490 articles published in the leading terrorism studies journals between 1990 and 1999 revealed that only eight, or 1.6 percent of them, could be regarded as conceptually-oriented papers.[2] This suggests that many scholars have largely given up on the challenging theoretical debates surrounding the central concept of the field. An examination of broader terrorism studies literature suggests four main approaches and practices towards the definition and conceptualisation of terrorism.[3] Arguably the most frequent practice—particularly amongst scholars who are newly arrived to the subject—is to simply use the term without defining it, on the misguided assumption that it is widely understood and accepted. Such an approach is problematic for a number of very obvious reasons, not least because terrorism is a highly emotive and divisive concept which different scholars and societies have often understood in very different ways.

A second approach, confined mainly to political leaders and security officials, but also to a surprising number of researchers and media pundits, is to define terrorism as an ideology or movement. Although groups specializing solely in terror do sometimes form, they are extremely rare and typically remain highly unstable and ephemeral. There are very few such groups operating today. In reality, most terrorism occurs in the context of wider political struggles in which the use of terror is one strategy among other more routine forms of contentious action.[4] As Charles Tilly puts it, “Properly understood, terror is a strategy, not a creed. Terrorists range across a wide spectrum of organizations, circumstances, and beliefs.”[5]

Third, it is not uncommon to see researchers adopt an actor-based definition in the literature, whereby terrorism is defined as a particular form of political violence committed by non-state actors who attack civilians. Bruce Hoffman, for example, argues that terrorism involves violence “perpetrated by a *subnational group* or *non-state entity*.”[6] This is in keeping with the U.S. State Department’s highly influential definition of terrorism, which conceives of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by *subnational groups* or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”[7] For scholars who adopt this definition, terrorism is largely indistinguishable from insurgency, militancy, guerrilla warfare and the like. More importantly, inherent to this approach is an assumption that while states may commit atroci-

ties, engage in political repression or torture opponents, this nonetheless does not constitute terrorism, in large part because states have the sovereign right to use force.[8] From this perspective, definitions of terrorism hinge on questions of legitimacy and sovereignty and the nature of the actor who employs the violence. As I will argue below, actor-based approaches to the definition of terrorism are both analytically untenable and politically suspect.

Lastly, and most commonly among the leading scholars in the field, terrorism is defined as a violent strategy or tactic that actors employ in pursuit of particular political goals. That is, terrorism is defined and understood by the nature and characteristics of the act itself, rather than the nature of actor, and is conceived as a particular kind of political action directed towards certain strategic goals rather than as a broad ideology or movement. Louise Richardson for example, defines terrorism as “politically motivated violence directed against non combatants or symbolic targets which is designed to communicate a message to a broader audience.”[9] Crucially, such a definitional approach accepts that states are also actors who can and frequently do adopt strategies of terrorism and commit terrorist acts. This is a useful formulation that provides the basis for the identifying criteria I present below.

Partly due to these definitional approaches, research on terrorism in the broader field has been characterised by a number of unfortunate tendencies. An initial tendency widely noted by some critics of the field is the selection bias of much terrorism research. In this case, the terrorism label is applied almost solely to non-state groups opposed to Western interests. It is usually not applied to those groups supported by Western states – even when they commit identical acts of civilian-directed violence such as hijackings, bombings, kidnappings and assassinations.[10] Thus, while left-wing groups have always received an inordinate amount of attention in terrorism studies literature, right-wing groups like the Contras, anti-Castro groups, US- and South African-supported movements in Angola and Mozambique, various Afghan factions, numerous Latin American death squads, and today a number of Iraqi death squads, have remained scandalously understudied. Although this is in part the result of the definitional practices noted above, it is also the result of an understandable but avoidable ideological bias amongst many Western scholars who adopt the interests of their own governments.

A more serious issue is that the field has been widely criticised for its failure to provide sustained analysis (and moral condemnation) of state terrorism. Indicative of the almost exclusive focus on “terrorism from below” as opposed to “terrorism from above” is the finding that only 12, or less than two percent, of articles from 1990 to 1999 in the core terrorism studies journals focused on state terrorism,[11] and that only 12 of the 768 pages in the *Encyclopaedia of World Terrorism* (1997) examined state terrorism in any form.[12] In part, this is due to the not infrequent practice noted above of defining terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence.

However, there are also many prominent scholars who accept that, objectively, terrorism is a strategy of political violence that any actor can employ, including states, yet simply refuse to examine cases of state terrorism in their research. Walter Laqueur, arguably one of the founders of terrorism studies, is emblematic of this practice: he openly accepts that states have killed many more people and caused far more material and social destruction than “terrorism from below”, but then argues that this is simply not the type of terrorism he wishes to examine.[13] It is perfectly understandable that scholars would wish to focus on particular subjects, but when an entire field neglects what is a very important dimension of the phenomenon, it raises troubling questions about the ideological orientation and political objectivity of the overall field.

Clearly, there are reasons for concern over this state of affairs. From a political-normative perspective, the field appears biased towards Western state interests and complicit in the terroristic practices Western states have regularly employed over the past two hundred years.[14] The well-documented use of political terror by Western states during the colonial period, the “terror bombing” during World War II and other conflicts, cold war counter-insurgency and pro-insurgency campaigns, the active sponsorship of right-wing non-state terrorist groups and the widespread use of torture during certain counter-terrorism campaigns, among others, are only the most prominent examples of the kind of terrorism that many Western states have employed. The failure to analyse state terrorism or to condemn it in the same morally assured terms as non-state terrorism appears to many observers as pro-Western bias and a toleration of certain forms of state-practiced terrorism.[15]

In addition, it represents a breakdown of scholarly procedure and a self-imposed intellectual blindness. It is intellectually unsustainable to argue that states cannot practice terrorism against their own people and against other states. For example, such an approach would argue that a car bomb detonated on a city street by clandestine state agents is not an act of terrorism, but an identical attack by non-state actors is. Or that the kidnap, torture and murder of a civilian by agents of the state are not terrorist acts, but the same act by a non-state group is

terrorism. Accepting that terrorism can only really be described according to the nature and quality of the particular act of violence—rather than the purported legitimacy of the actor who commits it [16]—has a number of serious consequences and implications.

In the first place, the acceptance that states are not exempted from employing terrorism raises serious questions about the broader focus of the field and the empirical foundations it is based on. That is, while non-state terrorists have killed tens of thousands and caused significant damage during the past century and a half, the acceptance that “states can be terrorists, too” [17] reveals that some individual states have been responsible for more terrorism than all non-state terrorist groups put together. A conservative estimate of state-instigated mass murder, forcible starvations and genocide against civilians for example, suggests that governments have been responsible for 170-200 millions deaths in the twentieth century alone.[18] Even if only a small proportion of these deaths can be strictly defined as state terrorism, the few hundred deaths caused every year by non-state terrorists pales beside the massive death, destruction and de-stabilisation caused by some states. Moreover, a great many states continue to employ terrorism on a considerable scale against their people today in places like Colombia, Haiti, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Pakistan, Uzbekistan,[19] Egypt, Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Tibet, North Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere. And yet, the broader terrorism studies field does not include statistics on state terrorism in any of its recognised databases, nor does it expend any real effort trying to understand the nature, causes, strategies and outcomes of state terrorism.[20]

A serious analytical breakdown occurs when an entire field largely fails to examine what is arguably the most serious aspect of the subject. It would be comparable to an imaginary situation in which criminologists focused most of their research on anti-social behaviour and burglaries, and failed to study in any systematic way the extent and causes of domestic violence, rape, murder, sexual abuse or other serious crimes.

Another important consequence of accepting state terrorism as “terrorism” (and not just “repression”) is the need to re-conceptualise some of the accepted truisms in the field regarding the nature of terrorist behaviour. It is not the case for example, that terrorism is solely the ‘weapon of the weak’; it can also be true that “the stronger the state, the stronger the temptation to rule through a regime of terror”. [21] In fact, an objective look at the history of terrorism would suggest that strong actors have used terror far more frequently than weak ones. Moreover, it is clear that contrary to popular beliefs, terrorism can be employed during war as well as during peace. For example, when states bomb civilian targets of no military value for the sole purpose of terrorising a population into surrender—a case of frightening one group of people in order to produce a political change in another—they are clearly committing a terrorist act.[22] Similarly, counter-terrorism itself can become terrorism under certain conditions:

When it fails to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty;
When it is highly disproportionate;
When it aims to terrify or intimidate the wider population or a particular community into submission;
When it is co-opted to serve a political agenda.[23]

Ultimately, there are important ethical-normative implications for the notion that states employ terrorism too, often under the guise of “counter-terrorism”. In the current climate, virtually every state and international organisation has adopted new anti-terrorism legislation, and military force—including “strategic bombing”—is frequently being used as a tool of counter-terrorism. At the very least, scholars should be highly suspicious of any and all attempts by states to define terrorism in ways that conveniently absolve what they or their agents do from being considered terrorism. They should refuse to accede to the common practice of exempting state officials from charges of terrorism, if for no other reason than that:

There is something morally suspicious, however, about people making laws that apply to everyone else accept [*sic*] themselves. The sheer fact that politicians have entered into a mutual-protection pact not to prosecute one another as ‘terrorists’ cannot change any logical or deontological facts of the matter. If what they do is otherwise indistinguishable from what is done by non-state actors that we would deem to be terroristic, then the acts of the state officials doing the same thing would be morally wrong for just the same reasons.[24]

It is not as if there understandable reasons exist for the continuing failure to agree upon a definition of the field’s central concept. In the first place, some of the key concepts at the heart of the definition of terrorism are

extremely subjective and difficult to determine objectively. Most definitions of terrorism by leading scholars for example, describe it as a form of *illegitimate* violence directed towards *innocent* civilians that is *intended* to intimidate or terrify an audience for *political* purposes. The question of what makes an act of violence legitimate or not, who is considered a civilian, how innocence can be measured, what the real intentions of often clandestine actors might be and what counts as a political aim, are all highly contested and subject to competing claims. As a consequence, in practice it is often the politically and culturally determined legitimacy of the particular group under scrutiny that determines whether its actions are labelled as “terrorism” and not necessarily the characteristics inherent to the violence itself.

Much more significantly however, terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be defined in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself. It lacks a clear ontological status—which actually makes an objective definition impossible. As two leading figures in the field put it, “The nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act... can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance”.[25] The bombing of civilians for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it may be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war.

The reality is that terrorism is a social fact rather than a brute fact. Although acts of violence are experienced as brute facts, the wider cultural-political meaning of those acts as “terrorism” for example, is decided through symbolic labelling, social agreement and a range of inter-subjective practices. That is, as a phenomenon, terrorism is constituted by and through the discursive practices which make it a concrete reality for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics and so on. We can identify a number of processes by which certain acts and individuals are constructed as “terrorism” and “terrorists”, including:

- The labelling of certain acts and groups as such by authoritative actors, such as the annual State Department reports;
- The legal definitions contained within criminal and international law;
- The compiling of statistics on terrorism by the CIA, RAND, and various academics and think-tanks; and
- The ascriptions of different groups and acts as “terrorist” in the media.

Actions and actors are constituted and reconstituted as terrorism in a continuous flow of social and political discourse. Moreover, analyses of these discourses reveal significant variation and instabilities between and within institutions, as well as shifts over time in the way terrorism is discursively constructed and delineated. [26] For example, before the late 1960s, there was virtually no “terrorism” spoken of by politicians, the media or academics; there were instead numerous references to “bombings”, “kidnappings”, “assassinations”, “hijackings” and so on.[27] The current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is in fact, a very recent invention. Similarly, in the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahidin were described as “freedom fighters”[28] before they were later reconstructed as “Islamic terrorists”. Numerous other groups and states have experienced the same kind of discursive transformation from “terrorist” or “state-sponsor of terrorism” to “freedom fighter”, “political leader” or “ally in the War on Terror”.

In an important sense, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices that seek to enclose it. In the same way that “races” do not exist objectively as a meaningful way of assigning identities and behavioural characteristics to individuals, but classifications of humankind do, so too “terrorism” does not exist as a kind of essential marker—even if classifications of different forms of political violence do.[29] A pertinent illustration of the ontological instability of the terrorism label is the observation that there are no less than four recognised “terrorists” who have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize: Menachem Begin, Sean McBride, Nelson Mandela and Yassir Arafat.[30] In other words, even within the confines of contemporary terrorism discourse, “once a terrorist, is not always a terrorist”.[31] It depends upon the current political context and the dominant discourses which determine and constitute it.

It is for this reason, among others, that some scholars argue that the term should be avoided or eschewed altogether in academic research. These scholars suggest that the appropriate focus of study is not the terrorism that exists out there “in reality”, but the discourses of terrorism and the discursive practices that construct terrorism as a political and cultural subject.[32] Another set of scholars argue more prosaically that terrorism is a political-cultural label and an act of de-legitimisation, and that no group ever accepts its designation as “terrorist”. They suggest that as a concept, “terrorism” has been greatly abused by political interests and has too many negative cultural and political connotations to retain any real analytical value. While these are cogent and chal-

lenging arguments, I do not accept that this means we should abandon the attempt to carefully and consistently determine which acts should be considered terrorist, or that we cannot agree on a set of fairly clear identifying criteria which can be employed for research purposes.

An Argument for Terrorism

It is my argument here that in spite of its insecure ontological status, its negative cultural-political baggage and its frequent misuse by political and academic actors, there are a number of important political and normative reasons for retaining the term “terrorism” as an organising concept for the field. I want to further suggest that the term can serve a useful function within a broader progressive political project to restrict and eliminate the use of certain kinds of illegitimate and oppressive forms of political violence. However, in order to achieve these lofty goals, scholars need to adopt the aims and commitments of a more ‘critical’ approach to terrorism.

Politically, there are a number of reasons why we should retain the term “terrorism” and engage in sustained and rigorous discursive struggle over its constitution and knowledge production. Most obviously, the term now has widespread political and cultural currency. It is the organising concept for a vast array of powerful political institutions, processes and practices in contemporary society, and scholars who refuse to employ or engage with it risk marginalising their views and their access to power. The term also clearly retains a great deal of academic currency. There is now a whole field of research, teaching and advocacy surrounding the concept of terrorism, with numerous journals, conferences, teaching programmes, think-tanks, research centres, funding opportunities and advisory posts in existence. To refuse to employ the term or engage in debates about its definition and application in research is again, to risk marginalisation and irrelevance within this broader scholarly context.

Most importantly however, there is a compelling normative imperative to retain a term that de-legitimises particular kinds of violence directed against civilians and which instrumentalises human suffering for the purposes of influencing an audience.[33] Of course, the normative power of the terrorism label is highly dependent upon its consistent application to all qualifying cases, including cases involving Western states or their allies. The selectivity and bias of terrorism scholars and political leaders in the past has seriously undermined this project by making it appear that the term is reserved solely for enemies of the West. However, I would argue that this provides a reason for critical engagement rather than withdrawal and capitulation in the discursive struggle.

Although terrorism can never be adequately defined due to its unstable ontological status, I want to argue that it can, and should, be described according to a set of identifiable and unique characteristics, which delineate it from other forms of political violence. Furthermore, a review of broader terrorism studies literature would suggest that the following conception of terrorism has broad support from many leading scholars in the field and could form the basis of a consensus over how to conceptualise it. Such an approach moreover, has several advantages over most of the existing approaches I outlined above. I suggest that as a form of political violence, terrorism can be described according to four main characteristics.

First, terrorism is an intentional and pre-determined strategy of political violence. This suggests its rational and instrumental basis. It also implies that any actor (states, groups or individuals) can employ it in pursuit of strategic goals. More importantly, it implies that actors can abandon its use at any time, and that being a “terrorist” is not a determinant of future behaviour or an indication of some kind of essential “evil” nature. “Terrorists” can choose to adopt non-violent strategies instead; they can even become statesmen and peacemakers. Importantly, it also implies political motivations, as a way of distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence designed to terrify, such as the intimidation of communities by organised criminals seeking to obtain financial reward, the terror caused by a serial killer, or the fear caused by a one-off mass killing. Lastly, it implies forethought and intentionality, as opposed to the terror induced by rioting or communal disturbances, for example.

Second, the targets of terrorist violence are not necessarily the victims of the violence, but rather the audiences to the violence. From this perspective, terrorism is a form of political communication rather than direct military action. An important distinction here is that terrorism instrumentalises its victims. Unlike the actions of soldiers in war who seek to directly degrade the material ability of the enemy to continue fighting, the victims of terrorism are chosen instead for symbolic reasons. An important point here is that states which try to hide their involvement in civilian-directed violence may still be sending a powerful message to the society or social groups they wish to intimidate. The use of disappearances as a strategy of terrorism for example, sends a message that the state is omnipotent, omnipresent and ruthless in rooting out opponents,[34] as does kidnap and torture. In

other cases, state terrorism may be both instrumental and direct: killing a union organiser for example, both weakens the union and sends a message to potential union leaders and the society they come from.

Third, and related to the previous point, terrorism is intended to cause fear and intimidate. This is the central purpose of the violence and not just the unintended consequence, although it can be argued that there is a certain kind of intentionality when actors engage in actions they can be sure will cause terror and intimidate, such as using airpower to bomb civilian areas. Moreover, the intention to cause fear can usually be deduced from the targets, context and foreseen consequences of the violence. Bombs in public places or the widespread use of torture against regime opponents for example, are clearly intended to terrify the wider society.

Lastly, terrorism is aimed primarily but not solely at civilians. Here I differ with some scholars in that I argue that it is often unhelpful to try and maintain civilian-military or combatant-non-combatant distinctions in conceptualising terrorism. I agree with Goodin in this regard that such distinctions can in fact, be counter-productive, as they allow actors to claim legitimacy for other forms of equally abhorrent violence.[35] A violent campaign aimed at police officers or off-duty military personnel that was intended to cause fear and intimidate the wider society or a certain section of society for example, would still constitute terrorism even though it avoided targeting civilians. Similarly, certain actions during war which were aimed solely at terrorising enemy soldiers and their civilian audience, rather than for military-strategic reasons, could also be considered terrorism. The use of certain types of militarily ineffective but demoralising chemical weapons or the bombing of civilian areas in which there were no real strategic targets, for example, would qualify as terrorism.

There are a number of clear advantages to employing such a conception of terrorism. In the first instance, it does not artificially and illogically limit the phenomenon by the nature of the actor (as some definitions do), but includes state terrorism, gender-based terrorism,[36] and non-state terrorism. Second, it does not limit the analysis to peace, but also includes the behaviour of actors in war—the site of a great deal of concentrated political violence. Lastly, as mentioned, it can be argued that there is already a consensus on these criteria among the leading terrorism scholars, as their definitions tend to incorporate all these elements. From this perspective, the main issue is not that we do not know what terrorism is or that we cannot clearly identify it; it is rather that the application of the definition is too often restricted—for whatever reason—to a narrow set of actors that most often happens to coincide with the current strategic interests of Western powers. During the cold war, most terrorism research focused on left-wing non-state groups; today, most terrorism research focuses on so-called “Islamist terrorism”. This inconsistent application both distorts the focus of the field and undermines attempts to restrict and eliminate oppressive forms of political violence.

Terrorism and Emancipation

In addition to its analytical advantages, the terrorism label could be employed as means to advancing a progressive political project aimed at protecting marginalised and vulnerable populations from indiscriminate and oppressive forms of violence. That is, at the most basic level, employing the above criteria can have the effect of de-legitimising any and all forms of violence that seek to instrumentalise human suffering for the sole purpose of sending a message to an audience. Related to this, it also de-legitimises all forms of civilian-directed violence, including the direct targeting of civilians during war.

Most importantly, however, this approach to terrorism brings back states as a subject for analysis and holds them accountable for actions that many recognise as terrorism but which are rarely acknowledged as terrorism, even by terrorism scholars. This is a critical task, given that the known effects and consequences of state terrorism—in terms of deaths, human suffering and material, social and political destruction—are far more serious than non-state terrorism. In this sense, the identifying criteria described above functions to set the limits of legitimate state violence, despite the frequent attempt to justify terroristic forms of violence by reference to doctrines of state sovereignty and the legitimate use of political violence. The criteria can also be used to scrutinise state practices during counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to ensure that they do not morph into terrorism themselves by failing to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty or being highly disproportionate, for example. Similarly, it can be used to evaluate state practices during times of war, identifying those occasions when military actions go beyond strategic necessity to the use of force for the purpose of intimidating and demoralising civilians.

In short, these criteria provide a strict set of criteria for the evaluation of actions by any and all actors who are in conflict. As such, they have the potential to strengthen the norms relating to the limits of political violence,

thereby improving human and social security. Importantly, the broad social and academic consensus, as well as the relevant legal precepts, is already in place for proscribing and de-legitimising actions that fall within the categories of illegitimate, terrorist violence outlined above.

However, in order to make this work in everyday scholarly practice, I would argue that terrorism scholars in particular would need to adhere to a set of core ontological, methodological and normative commitments. These have been outlined in detail elsewhere,[37] but would include, among others:

- An acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field and an acceptance of the insecure ontological status of the term;
- Transparency about their own values and political standpoints, particularly as they relate to the geopolitical interests of Western states;
- A willingness to expand their focus of research to include the use of terrorism by states, including Western states engaged in operations overseas;
- Adherence to a set of responsible research ethics, including a commitment to refusing to cooperate with state counter-terrorism projects that include the use of torture, illegal practices such as rendition or the victimising of whole “suspect communities”;
- A commitment to normative values which reject any and all forms of civilian-directed violence and which promotes a broad notion of human security.

In particular, terrorism scholars must recognise the cultural-political biases they hold and aim for consistency of application of the criteria set out. Specifically, they must demonstrate a willingness to scrutinise and condemn the actions and intentions of their own states when they cross the line into terrorism. This is in fact, the biggest problem facing the field in this area. It is not that terrorism scholars do not recognise the use of terrorism by states; it is rather that they limit the focus of their research largely to non-state groups that are opposed to Western interests and fail to acknowledge the long history of involvement of their own states or allied states in terrorism.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that even though terrorism is impossible to define and the study of terrorism is beset by some unhelpful biases and knowledge practices, it is both possible and necessary to retain the term as a focus for research. I have further suggested that as an analytical term, terrorism can potentially also play an important normative function. However, in order to realise this potential, terrorism scholars need to acknowledge and accept the ethico-political content of their subject and commit themselves to a number of transparent principles.

The consequences of failing to do so are that the field remains unbalanced, politically biased and highly limited in its focus. More importantly, unless these imbalances are addressed, the field is in danger of reinforcing the view that terrorism is solely a problem of non-state groups and individuals, and that states are immune from condemnation or sustained scholarly analysis. As such, there is a danger that terrorism studies will continue to be seen by some as simply an arm of the state security sector and a bastion of support for the Global War on Terror. Considering some of the morally questionable and counter-productive policies at the heart of current state security practices in the global counter-terrorism campaign—such as extraordinary rendition, the widespread use of torture, internment at Guantanamo Bay, pre-emptive war, extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects, shoot-to-kill policies, intrusive surveillance, aid and support for authoritarian regimes and the like—this should sound a clarion call for concerted action to scholars in the field.

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NOTES:

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 17-19 December, 2007, University of Cambridge.

[2] Silke, A. (2004) ‘The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research’, in A. Silke, (ed), *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*. London: Frank Cass, p. 207.

[3] For an excellent overview of the main definitional approaches in the field, see Raphael, S. (2007) ‘Putting the State Back In: The Ortho-

dox Definition of Terrorism and the Critical Need to Address State Terrorism', Paper Prepared for British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 17-19 December, 2007, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom, available online at: <http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2007/tuesday.htm>.

[4] Tilly, C. (2004) 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists', *Sociological Theory*, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 6; Schmid, A. (2004) 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 199.

[5] Tilly, 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists', p. 5.

[6] Hoffman, B. (1998) *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, p.43.

[7] Emphasis added. Quoted in Martin, G. (2003) *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, p. 33.

[8] See Raphael, 'Putting the State Back In'.

[9] Richardson, L., quoted in Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (eds) (2000) *The Future of Terrorism* London: Frank Cass.

[10] I explore this problem in Jackson, R. (2007) 'Critical Reflection on Counter-sanctuary Discourse', in Michael Innes, (ed), *Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

[11] Silke, 'The Road Less Travelled', p. 206.

[12] Quoted in Goodin, R. (2006) *What's Wrong with Terrorism?* Cambridge: Polity Press 2006, p. 55.

[13] Laqueur, W. (1977), *Terrorism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 6.

[14] Western state terrorism is discussed in more detail in Jackson, 'Critical Reflection on Counter-sanctuary Discourse'.

[15] See for example, George, A. (1991), *Western State Terrorism*, Cambridge: Polity Press; Herman, E. (1982) *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, South End Press.

[16] In any case, it can be argued that states who employ terror as a mode of governance lack legitimacy.

[17] Goodin, *What's Wrong With Terrorism?*, pp. 50-77

[18] See Rummel, R. (1994) *Death by Government*. Somerset, NJ: Transaction Books; see also Goodin, *What's Wrong With Terrorism?*, p. 67).

[19] The former British ambassador to Uzbekistan reveals the nature and extent of Uzbek state terror and Western complicity in Craig Murray, *Murder in Samarkland: A British Ambassador's Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror* (Mainstream Publishing, 2006).

[20] This is not to say that there are no scholars who examine state terrorism, simply that they are few and far between and tend to exist on the margins of or even outside of the main field. There has been some outstanding research on state terrorism, including: Sluka, J. (ed.), (2000), *Death Squad: An Anthropology of State Terror* (Penn: University of Pennsylvania Press); Stohl, M. and Lopez, G. (eds.) (1986), *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, ed. Bernard Johnpoll, Contributions in Political Science, New York: Greenwood; Gareau, F. (2004), *State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism*, London: Zed Books; and Grosscup, B. (2006) *Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment*. London: Zed Books.

[21] Goodin, *What's Wrong With Terrorism?* p. 52

[22] On the issue of terrorism during war, an excellent example is Grosscup, B. (2006) *Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment*. London: Zed Books. Grosscup provides a thoroughly convincing and eloquent argument about why the doctrine and practice of strategic bombing constitutes a form of state terrorism – not least because its original formulation was as 'terror bombing' aimed at civilians and intended 'to create such terror, destruction and misery as to undermine civilians' morale and in swift order break their fragile will to resist' (p. 24). He goes on to document the use of 'terror bombing' against civilian populations in numerous European colonies, in the Spanish Civil War and during World War II, and then in its new formulation as 'strategic bombing' in numerous conflicts since such as Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam, Lebanon, Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, Grosscup demonstrates that the two most common justifications for strategic bombing – that unlike non-state terrorism it does not deliberately target civilians and that when large numbers of civilians are killed it is not intentional – are in fact, highly specious (p. 179).

[23] Goodin, *What's Wrong With Terrorism?* pp. 69-73.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[25] Schmid, A. and A. Jongman, (1988) *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*, Oxford: North Holland, p. 101.

[26] See Zulaika, J. and W. Douglass, (1996) *Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism*, London: Routledge; Jackson, R. (2005). *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism*, Manchester: Manchester University Press; Jackson, R. (2007) 'Constructing Enemies: "Islamic Terrorism" in Political and Academic Discourse', *Government & Opposition*, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 394-426; Winkler, C. (2006) *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era*, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press; Collins, J. and Glover, R. (eds.) (2002) *Collateral Language: A User's Guide to America's New War* (New York University Press, 2002); and Croft, S. (2006) *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

[27] See Zulaika and Douglass, *Terror and Taboo*.

[28] Livingston, S. (1994) *The Terrorism Spectacle*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

[29] Sluka, J. (2002) 'Comment: What Anthropologists should know about the Concept of "Terrorism"', *Anthropology Today*, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 23.

[30] Zulaika and Douglass, *Terror and Taboo*, p. x.

[31] Schmid, A. (2004) 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 205.

[32] See Zulaika and Douglass, *Terror and Taboo*.

[33] This point was made to me in conversation with Ken Booth, Aberystwyth University.

[34] See Sluka, 'Introduction'.

[35] Goodin, *What's Wrong With Terrorism?* p. 15.

[36] See Sharlach, L. (forthcoming) 'Veil and Four Walls: A State of Terror in Pakistan', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, vol. 1, no. 1.

[37] See Jackson, R. (2007) 'The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies', *European Political Science*, 6(3), 244-51.

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