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by Eric Price
Monographs and Edited Volumes published in 2010, selected by Eric Price (Professional Information Specialist)
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by Peter Lehr
The article describes the escalation of acts of maritime piracy emanating from the coast of Somalia, comparing them to the wave of aerial hijackings in the 1960s and 1970s in terms of demands, including political demands. The advantages for the pirates to gang up with land-based al-Shabaab terrorists are discussed and likely developments sketched.
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by Marc Sageman
Counter-terrorism policy should be based on a comprehensive analysis of the facts. A comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the West shows that there were 60 plots over the past 20 years, perpetrated by 46 different networks. Of these only 14 successfully inflicted any casualty, and only two were perpetrated by al-Qaeda proper in the past 20 years. Over the past five years, global neo-jihadi and al-Qaeda terrorism in the West is in decline and the vast majority of the plots were perpetrated by independent homegrown groups, inspired by al- Qaeda but not linked to it or its allies. Since 9/11/01, none of the plots could be traced back to Afghanistan. Indeed, the detailed trial transcripts of the major plots in the West since 9/11/01 show that there was no al-Qaeda training in Afghanistan and that there is no Afghan among the perpetrators. There has been no global neo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the West in the past four years and none in the U.S. in the past eight years. This means that the U.S. military surge in Afghanistan will not help protect U.S. and Western homelands from a- Qaeda and its allies. The argument that the surge will prevent a return of al-Qaeda to Afghanistan to the same level of threat as prior to 2001 is based on many dubious assumptions. Counter-terrorism in the West has been very successful and the value added of an increased counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan is debatable.
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by Isaac Kfir
The paper reviews the current state of affairs in Afghanistan and argues that the failure to understand the nature and structure of Pashtun society is responsible for a lack of progress towards peace and security. The first section offers a review of Afghanistan and Pashtun society, the second an analysis of the situation in Afghanistan after 9/11, the third concludes with some recommendations as to how to progress.
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